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ARTICLE

POLITICS, IDENTITY, AND PLEADING DECISIONS ON
THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS

STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG†
We report the results of an empirical study of appeals from rulings on motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal. We first describe the role
that pleading was intended to play in the original (1938) Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, review the Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, and offer a brief
discussion of common themes in normative scholarship that is critical of Twombly
and Iqbal, including the claim that they threaten to amplify ideological and subjective
decision-making, particularly in civil rights cases.
We then empirically examine the extent to which the party (of appointing
president), gender, and racial composition of panels are associated with their
disposition of 12(b)(6) appeals across all policy areas pooled, also separately analyzing
discrimination claims, all “other civil rights” claims, and non-civil rights claims. We
separately analyze a random sample of (predominantly non-precedential) cases and
a set of only precedential cases.
In our random sample of cases, we find that panels with women and non-white
judges are substantially more likely to rule in favor of a plaintiff reaching discovery
in other civil rights claims, an important and cross-cutting civil rights category
amounting to a quarter of 12(b)(6) appeals in our data, but that race and gender are
insignificant outside that substantive area. Party is insignificant across the board in
the random sample.
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The results are different when the panel is making law. In precedential cases, we
find that Democratic panels were significantly more likely to decide in favor of
plaintiffs in non-civil rights claims. We also find that panels with one woman were
more likely to decide precedential other civil rights claims in favor of plaintiffs, and
that panels with two women (but not one) were more likely to do so in non-civil
rights claims.
Our results for gender contradict conventional wisdom in the literature that
women judges’ preferences differ from men’s only in cases implicating discrimination.
They add to evidence suggesting the possibility that procedural law affecting access to
justice may itself be a policy domain in which women have different (more pro-access)
preferences that extend beyond discrimination claims. Gender, alone among the judge
characteristics we study, is significant in both random sample and precedential-only
models, and in both civil rights and non-civil rights models, revealing a distinctive
propensity among women on the Courts of Appeal to support plaintiffs’ access to
discovery.
Finally, significant variation in our results across the random sample and
precedential cases highlights the risk of error in drawing general inferences from either
significant or null results in precedential cases—general inferences that are
widespread in the literature on the Courts of Appeals.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent work we have sought to illuminate the extent to which federal
court decisions in the realm of procedure reflect non-legal influences on
judicial behavior that have been shown to affect decisions about substantive
law in policy areas of high salience. We started by studying the decisions of
the Supreme Court on issues implicating private enforcement of federal law,
such as standing, attorney’s fees, arbitration of federal claims, and the
interpretation of pertinent Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 We found that,
as a group, these decisions are more influenced by ideology than are the
Court’s decisions on merits issues, and that the Court’s Federal Rules
decisions are more influenced by ideology than either.2
Motivated by these findings to extend the scope of the inquiry beyond the
Supreme Court and beyond ideology, we compiled an original comprehensive
data set that includes precedential Court of Appeals decisions on issues of
class certification under Rule 23 from 1967 through 2017, together with
nonprecedential decisions since 2002. In the first article based on these data,
we explored the roles of ideology, race and gender in class certification
decisions.3 We found that, at the Court of Appeals level, ideology is strongly
associated with class certification decisions, playing a role akin to that found

1 See STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 130-91 (2017). For a full description of
the data set, see id. at 143-44. See also Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class Actions and the
Counterrevolution against Federal Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1465 (2017).
2 See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 1, at 180-81.
3 See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Politics, Identity, and Class Certification on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 119 MICH. L. REV. 231 (2020) (hereinafter Politics & Identity). A second article
using this data set has recently been published. See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Class
Certification in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: A Longitudinal Study, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73
(2021).
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in cases raising some of the most controversial substantive law issues of the
day.4 To those who understand the power of procedure in general and the
catalytic power of the class certification decision in particular, and who have
followed the increasing role that ideology has played in Court of Appeals
appointments in recent decades, this was not a surprise.
Reflecting on the centrality of the class certification decision to court
access and the importance of class actions in the struggles for racial and
gender equality caused us to study whether identity characteristics such as
race and gender may also play a role in class certification decisions. Here,
unlike our investigations of the role of ideology, we were not merely
extending prior panel-effects studies of judicial behavior, which have
neglected procedural decisions. We were working in the context of an
emerging consensus that Court of Appeals “judges’ gender and race are
associated with variation in preferences only in a narrow band of cases
presenting issues of substantive law that directly and explicitly implicate
discrimination and inequality.”5 We found that the presence of one African
American on a panel, and the presence of two women (but not one), is
associated with pro-certification outcomes even in cases not involving civil
rights claims. For many, we think, this was a surprise.
Although neither our data nor prior panel-effects scholarship enabled us
to identify the reasons for the different preferences of women and African
Americans as to class certification, we offered several suggestions to guide
further study:
As transsubstantive procedural law, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
apply across substantive domains and can enable or constrict access to justice.
A controlling interpretation of a Federal Rule in an antitrust case, for
example, will carry over into its application in a voting rights case. One
important insight of this Article is that the transsubstantive nature of the
Federal Rules can also convey the substantive effects of diversity across the
landscape of American regulatory law. Court of Appeals judges understand
that the Federal Rules are transsubstantive, as are the effects of some Federal
Rules (importantly including Rule 23) on the enforcement of substantive law.
As strategic actors, it would be rational for them to take into consideration
how class-certification doctrine in a case that does not implicate issues on
which they have strong preferences might affect certification in cases that do.
Alternatively, or in addition, our results may be the first evidence that
4 See Burbank & Farhang, Politics & Identity, supra note 3, at 258 (Table 4). “We suspect that
many will be surprised that the outcome changes associated with moving from unified Democratic
to Republican panels in certification decisions is larger than, for example, such changes in obscenity,
capital punishment, employment discrimination, desegregation, and abortion cases.” Id. at 257.
5 Id. at 236.
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transsubstantive procedural law affecting access to justice is itself a policy
domain in which women and African Americans have distinctive
preferences.6

In this article, we report the first results of a study designed to gain
additional insight on the extent to which ideology, race and gender are
associated with judges’ decisions on procedural issues critical to court access.
For this purpose, we chose to study federal appeals challenging rulings on
motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) after the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v Twombly7 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal.8 We created two original data sets, one consisting of precedential
(published) decisions after Iqbal was decided in 2009 through 2019, and the
other a random sample of decisions in the same period, a substantial majority
of which are nonprecedential (unpublished) decisions.
In Section I we first describe the role that pleading was intended to play
in the original (1938) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, stressing the views of
the original Advisory Committee that (1) pleading was an inferior means to
uncover the facts grounding a plaintiff ’s claims, a role better left to discovery,
and (2) judicial gate-keeping at the pleading stage often arbitrarily and
unfairly deprived plaintiffs of access to information that was available only
through discovery.
We then discuss strategies that emerged in response to an enormous
increase in federal litigation beginning in the late 1960s, which sought more
effectively to curb wasteful litigation behavior and identify and weed out
claims lacking sufficient support to warrant a trial (or elicit a settlement).
One such strategy was to restore fact pleading by amending the Federal Rules,
but it never gained traction, probably because the Advisory Committee
recognized that the effort would embroil the rulemaking process in political
controversy, putting at risk the major source of the judiciary’s control of
procedure by legislative intervention in that domain.
Although the rulemaking process was used repeatedly to rein in the costs
of discovery, the Supreme Court invoked discovery’s costs as a reason to
change the requirements that the pleading rules impose. We describe the
Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, stressing that the Court’s
reinterpretations of the pertinent rules introduced a new gatekeeping
strategy, rooted in denying a presumption of truth to allegations deemed to
be conclusory, and dismissing claims deemed to be implausible based on
“judicial experience and common sense.” We conclude Section I with a brief
6
7
8

Id. at 238-39.
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
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discussion of common themes in normative scholarship that is critical of
Twombly and Iqbal, including the claim that they threaten to amplify
subjective decision-making.
In Section II, we review the empirical literature on the association
between outcomes and Court of Appeals judges’ party (of appointing
president), gender and race. That literature has overwhelmingly ignored
transsubstative procedural law. Empirical results in the literature are
something of a patchwork, with scholars sometimes detecting significant
relationships where they expected to find them, but sometimes not, in ways
that are difficult to explain based upon general theories about salience or
preferences. Still, an apparent consensus has emerged that gender and race
are associated with voting only on some types of claims based on
discrimination or inequality.
Finally, in Section III we describe our data and results. Critics of Twombly
and Iqbal worry that the new 12(b)(6) standard introduces excessive
subjectivity and ideology into disposition of 12(b)(6) motions, with a
particular concern about civil rights cases. Although we do not compare preand post-Iqbal decision-making, we examine the extent to which the party,
gender and race of panel members are associated with their disposition of
12(b)(6) appeals in cases brought by individuals against business or
government since Iqbal. In addition to analyzing all policy areas pooled, we
separately analyze discrimination claims, all “other civil rights” claims, and
non-civil rights claims. We also separately analyze a random sample of
(predominantly non-precedential) cases, and a set of only precedential cases.
Our results vary across identity characteristic, policy area, and random
sample versus precedential cases. The patchwork character of our results
reflects the judicial behavior literature that we contribute to.
In our random sample of cases, we find that judges’ gender and race are
associated with outcomes in other civil rights claims (excluding
discrimination). This broad and varied civil rights category amounts to one
in four 12(b)(6) appeals in our data, overwhelmingly made up of
constitutional claims against governmental actors, commonly arising in such
areas as policing, prisons, and public employment. Panels with one woman or
one non-white judge have more than double the likelihood of rendering a
decision in favor of the plaintiff as compared to all-male and all-white panels.
In the same models, party of appointing president is clearly insignificant. We
are aware of no prior Court of Appeals study to find that gender and race are
associated with outcomes when party is insignificant. Gender and race are not
simply amplifying ideology as measured by party; they are consequential
where party is not. With eighty-six percent of claims in the data decided by
panels with some degree of gender or racial diversity, diversity on the Courts
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of Appeals has a broad and favorable impact on plaintiffs’ ability to reach
discovery in other civil rights claims. The remaining judge characteristic
variables in the other random sample models—all policy areas pooled,
discrimination claims, and non-civil rights claims—are insignificant.
However, when panels are in the posture of making law, the results are
different. In precedential cases we find that Democratic panels were
significantly more likely to rule for plaintiffs when all non-civil rights claims are
pooled. All-Democratic panels are more than twice as likely to allow the plaintiff
to proceed to discovery when compared to Republican-majority ones. This set
of cases asserting non-civil rights claims, pooled across many policy areas,
amounts to about half the precedential cases. The most common are consumer,
contract, labor, personal injury, antitrust, and securities (in that order).
Party remains insignificant, however, in precedential discrimination and
other civil rights claims, as it was in the random sample. Contrary to
expectations, party appears to matter least (or not at all) to pleading decisions
in the policy area where many scholars (including us) thought it would matter
most: civil rights. Although many studies of the Courts of Appeals have found
party consequential to votes and outcomes in civil rights cases, we find that
this is not so when the question is narrowed to whether a plaintiff has stated
a claim sufficient to proceed to discovery.
Gender is significant across more policy areas in precedential cases. Panels
with one woman were more likely to decide for the plaintiff in other civil
rights claims, although they were not more likely to do so in discrimination
claims. Panels with women in the majority, but not panels with one woman,
were more likely to decide for the plaintiff in non-civil rights claims—more
than twice as likely. One woman panel-affects (changes the votes of) male
majorities in civil rights but not non-civil rights claims. These results
contradict conventional wisdom in the literature that judge gender on the
Courts of Appeals is only consequential in certain discrimination cases. They
add further evidence, along with our class certification study discussed below,
to the conclusion that women have more pro-access preferences that are more
broad-ranging. Among the three judge characteristics that we study, only
gender is significant in both random sample and precedential-only models,
and in both civil rights and non-civil rights models. Gender is distinctively
associated with panels’ propensity to allow plaintiffs to proceed to discovery.
Race is insignificant in all precedential models, including other civil rights
claims, an area in which it was highly significant with a substantively large
association in the (mostly non-precedential) random sample. This highlights
an unexpected and important lesson. A judge characteristic may not be
significantly associated with outcomes in precedential cases—which are the
basis of nearly all Court of Appeal studies—while a significant association
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actually exists in the full universe. One potential explanation is that white
majorities are less likely to give precedential status to decisions in which they
make concessions to (are panel affected by) non-white judges. These findings
show that null results for gender and race in precedential cases cannot support
the inference that gender and race are not consequential to outcomes in the
full universe—an inference widespread in the literature.
I. PLEADING, DISCOVERY AND ACCESS TO COURT UNDER THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. The Original Understanding
Law prescribing how detailed and persuasive the complaint commencing a
lawsuit must be has important implications for the ability of potential plaintiffs
to pursue adjudication of disputes on the merits, including their ability to
discover relevant information from defendants in order to prove their
allegations. It thus also has important implications for the ability of those who
have been injured to use litigation in order to secure compensation, and the
ability of government to use private litigation for the enforcement of public law.
From the perspective of potential defendants, pleading law affects the ease
with which they can be summoned to court and forced to incur costs in
defending against, or settling, what may be meritless claims. Finally, from the
(self-interested) perspective of the judiciary, pleading law affects the volume
of civil litigation and the types of litigation activity that filed cases produce,
both of which affect the allocation of resources by court systems.
The original (1938) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were designed to
facilitate litigation on the merits, including litigation enforcing public law. In
this they reflected the jurisprudential and social commitments of the
individuals who were responsible for drafting them. The way that those
individuals approached pleading and discovery made these procedural
features critical pillars of the regime they created, and it is thus not surprising
that they have been important sites of contestation.
The Advisory Committee responsible for drafting the 1938 Federal Rules
designed pleading rules that were simple and flexible. The Committee was in
part reacting to the existence in many states of pleading law—applicable in
federal courts in those states—that required the plaintiff to allege facts
supporting each cause of action relied on. The Committee objected to this
type of “fact pleading” because it entailed arbitrary distinctions among, and
wasteful disputes about, “facts,” “conclusions,” and “evidence.”9 More
9 As Edgar Tolman, who bore major responsibility for explaining the proposed new Federal
Rules to Congress, put it in his 1938 House testimony:
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fundamentally, vast changes in social and economic life since the midnineteenth century (when fact pleading was introduced) had made it harder
for many people suffering injuries—especially those without resources to
conduct an extensive pre-filing investigation – to know what the facts were.
The drafters believed that pleading is an inferior method to find out what
actually happened.10
The original Advisory Committee opted instead for “notice pleading,”
under which a plaintiff ’s complaint was at risk of dismissal (for merits-related
reasons) only if, under Rule 12(b)(6), it failed to state a claim that was legally
tenable or if, under Rule 12(e), it failed to give the defendant fair notice of
what that claim was. Federal Rule 8 required that a complaint include only “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” In discussing one of the forms that the Committee created to
demonstrate acceptable pleading practice under Rule 8 at an Institute for
members of the bar, Dean Charles Clark, the Committee’s Reporter, observed:
[A]n allegation which says simply that the defendant did injure the plaintiff
through his negligence is too general and would not stand, for really that tells
you no differentiating features about the case whatsoever, except the very
broad word “negligence”; while on the other hand . . . the statement of the
act in question in a general way, and with a characterization that it is
negligent, is sufficient. That is the allegation in this form (Form 9). Here,
instead of saying defendant’s negligence caused the injury, you say that
defendant negligently drove his automobile against the plaintiff, who was
then crossing the street, and you have then the case isolated from every other
I want you now to consider this provision in Rule 8, as to what you have to put into
your paper. You used to have the requirement that a complaint must allege the “facts”
constituting the “cause of action.” I can show you thousands of cases that have gone
wrong on dialectical, psychological, and technical argument as to whether a pleading
contained a “cause of action”; and of whether certain allegations were allegations of
“fact” or were “conclusions of law” or were merely “evidentiary” as distinguished from
“ultimate” facts.
Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 75th Cong. 94 (1938) (statement of Edgar B. Tolman, Secretary of the Advisory Committee
on Rules for Civil Procedure Appointed by the Supreme Court).
10 Again, Tolman explained:
One important consideration should be emphasized as to the method by which, under
these rules, the opponents may be adequately advised as to the real matter in
controversy. The simplified pleadings provided for . . . which give a general view of
the controversy are supplemented by the provisions for depositions, discovery and
pretrial practice . . . which enable each side by the examination of witnesses,
documents, and other evidence, to ascertain in advance of the trial, precise knowledge
as to the nature of the case.
Id. at 98.

2136

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 2127

type of case of the same character, really from every other case, as a pedestrian
or collision case. At the pleading stage, in advance of the evidence, before the
parties know how the case is going to shape up, that is all, in all fairness, you
can require.11

Implementing the view that pleading should play a minor role in
litigation—and that common law trials were inefficient because the parties
often were in the dark about the issues—required other means to ascertain
facts prior to trial. To that end the architects of the 1938 Federal Rules wrote
rules that afforded parties pre-trial authority to demand information from
other parties (and non-parties) much greater than had been available under
prior systems.12 Such broad discovery appealed to the commitments of the
Progressive movement in American law,13 of which Edson Sunderland, the
chief architect of the Federal Rules on discovery, had long been a proponent.
Progressives contended that effective regulation was impossible without
access to the facts concerning the regulated enterprise. As Sunderland wrote
in 1925:
The spirit of the times calls for disclosure, not concealment, in every field—
in business dealings, in governmental activities, in international relations,
and the experience of England makes it clear that the courts need no longer
permit litigating parties to raid one another from ambush.14

Eliminating the gatekeeping role of fact pleading required some other
means to prevent the trial of claims that lacked evidentiary support after
adequate opportunity for discovery. For this purpose, with Sunderland again
taking the lead, the original Advisory Committee drew on experience in
England. They made available to both plaintiffs and defendants, and in all
cases, what in England had been used primarily to enable plaintiffs to collect
debts: the motion for summary judgment.15 Discussing this new tool, for
11 A MERICAN B AR A SSOCIATION , F EDERAL R ULES OF C IVIL P ROCEDURE :
P ROCEEDINGS OF THE I NSTITUTE AT W ASHINGTON , D.C. AND OF S YMPOSIUM AT N EW
Y ORK C ITY 241 (1938). See also id. at 308 (“What these rules do emphasize with respect to the
contents of a pleading (as the forms in the Appendix show) is that any plain telling of the story that
shows that the pleader is entitled to relief upon the grounds he states is sufficient to bring the
pleader’s cause into court. That the statement or averment includes a conclusion of law is no ground
for a motion to strike or for a motion to make definite, merely because the statement or averment
embodies a conclusion which might be elaborated by a more particularized detailing of the facts.”)
(George Donworth).
12 See supra note 10.
13 See Ken I. Kersch, The Reconstruction of Constitutional Privacy Rights and the New American
State, in 16 STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 61, 84 (2002).
14 Edson R. Sunderland, An Appraisal of English Procedure, 24 MICH. L. REV. 109, 116 (1925).
15 See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting
from Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. E MP . L EG . S TUD . 591, 594-603 (2004). As discussed there,
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which the Advisory Committee had no domestic empirical evidence and
about which many members harbored doubts, including doubts arising under
the Seventh Amendment,16 the Reporter told members of the bar:
The great question about the motion for summary judgment is whether it
may not be attempted in all sorts of cases, whereas it is only really going to
perform its function in the simple case where there isn’t much of a defense.
It is quite possible that the motion . . . may be resorted to too much and may
become an instrument of delay.17

B. The Road to Retrenchment
In the years following the advent of the Federal Rules, a number of
Supreme Court decisions, including Hickman v. Taylor18 and Conley v.
Gibson,19 embraced the concepts of notice pleading and broad discovery, while
others seemed to constrain the ability of summary judgment to separate
wheat from chaff.20 Eventually, however, notice pleading, broad discovery
(unleashed further by amendments to the Federal Rules in 1970), and a
restrictive view of summary judgment assumed a different complexion. In an
era of growing social and economic regulation, statutory incentives to litigate
(e.g., a host of new federal statutes with pro-plaintiff fee-shifting
provisions),21 the modern class action, and a bar responsive to such incentives
elevated the role of litigation in American governance. As federal courts
began to labor under the weight of increasing caseloads, those responsible for
federal procedure sought better means to curtail wasteful litigation behavior
Sunderland had drafted broad summary judgment provisions for Michigan a few years earlier, but
there was no documented experience under them.
16 A member of the Committee cautioned:
I am in favor of retaining trial by jury inviolate and not in any instance substituting
trial by affidavit, whether the party is in good faith or not. I think this is one of the
most serious rules in our whole group, and it will be the one subject to the most
criticism unless you throw every safeguard around the man who wants his case tried
by a jury. Trial by jury is the safeguard of the man who otherwise would not get a
square deal. I am very much opposed to giving any color to the charge that these rules
in any way encroach on that right.
Proceedings of Meeting of Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure of the Supreme Court
of the United States (Feb. 20–25, 1936), microformed on Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference,
Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedures, 1935–1988, Nos. CI-210-35, CI-210-37, CI 210-54,
at 830–31 (Feb. 20, 1936) (Mr. Donworth).
17 A MERICAN B AR A SSOCIATION , F EDERAL R ULES OF C IVIL P ROCEDURE :
P ROCEEDINGS OF THE C LEVELAND I NSTITUTE 225 (1938).
18 350 U.S. 544 (1947).
19 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
20 See, e.g., Adickes v. Kress, 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
21 See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE (2010).
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and to identify cases ripe for early termination. Through rulemaking and
judicial decisions, they enlisted a variety of tools for these purposes, from
sanctions to case management to discovery reform, and from the law of
summary judgment to the law of pleading.
Pleading was an early candidate for retrenchment. In the 1950s, whether
from affection for the old or fear of the new, some federal judges sought a
return to fact pleading through amendments to the Federal Rules. They had
no success with the Advisory Committee, and the timing of Conley v. Gibson
was such that it could be viewed as a rebuke of the effort.22 Several subsequent
attempts similarly ran aground in the Advisory Committee.23 The Committee
likely recognized that, if pursued, such proposals would embroil the
rulemaking process in partisan political controversy, endangering the main
source of the federal judiciary’s control of procedure by threatening legislative
intervention in that domain. Moreover, their attitude in that regard did not
change even after, twice within a decade (1993-2002), the Supreme Court
reversed lower courts for imposing heightened pleading requirements in civil
rights and employment discrimination cases through judge-made law,
insisting that such changes must come from legislation or amendments to the
Federal Rules.24
But pleading was not the main target of the long-running campaign
against litigation that has been waged on behalf of business. Over the last
fifty years, the greatest source of complaints about federal litigation has been
its cost, with the primary culprit said to be the cost of discovery, particularly
document discovery, most of which is borne by the party from which
discovery is sought and cannot be shifted from the winner to the loser. At the
same time, however, thoughtful scholars and judges have pointed out the
potential costs of cutting back on discovery. Thus, Paul Carrington, former
Reporter of the Advisory Committee, observed:
We should keep clearly in mind that discovery is the American alternative to
the administrative state . . . every day, hundreds of American lawyers caution
their clients that an unlawful course of conduct will be accomplished by
serious risk of exposure at the hands of some hundreds of thousands of
lawyers, each armed with a subpoena power by which misdeeds can be
uncovered. Unless corresponding new powers are conferred on public
See Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Fact Pleading, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749, 1750 (1998).
See id. at 1751–52.
See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). See also Crawford-El v.
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 594–95 (1998). Apparently, the message was lost on, or simply unacceptable
to, some lower federal courts, as the practice persisted even after Swierkiewicz. See, e.g., Perry v.
Southeastern Boll Weevil Erad. Fund, Inc., 154 Fed. Appx. 467, 472 (6th Cir. 2005); Danley v. Allen,
540 F.3d 1298, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2008).
22
23
24
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officers, constricting discovery would diminish disincentives for lawless
behavior across a wide spectrum of forbidden conduct.25

The rulemakers have responded to complaints about discovery with round
after round of amendments designed to discipline the discovery process,26 the
cumulative effect of which has been to render that process more complex. Yet,
empirical research conducted over many decades has not demonstrated that
discovery is a problem—is disproportionately expensive—in more than a
small slice of litigation. Instead, study after study has found that discovery is
a problem in precisely the types of cases that one would expect—high-stakes,
complex cases.27 These are the types of cases entailing the problems that have
preoccupied the rulemakers in recent decades. Because the Federal Rules are
transsubstantive and make few distinctions according to perceived procedural
needs, the solutions the rulemakers have devised for complex cases—and the
added expense those solutions can entail—are usually applicable in all cases.
That which may be a cure in high-stakes, complex cases may also be a curse
in simpler cases of modest stakes.28
C. The New Regime
1. The Supreme Court’s Pleading Decisions
The Supreme Court invoked pervasive discovery abuse and crushing
discovery expense, together with the asserted inability of federal judges to
manage discovery, as reasons to change federal procedural law—but not the
law that governs discovery. They did so by (1) resuscitating distinctions
25 Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 54 (1997). Judge Patrick
Higginbotham, former Chair of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, also emphasized the
relationship of discovery to the ability of “private attorneys-general” to enforce congressional
statutes, observing that “[c]alibration of discovery is calibration of the level of enforcement of the
social policy set by Congress.” Patrick Higginbotham, Foreword, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1997).
26 For a discussion of the Committee’s discovery proposals in historical context, see Letter
from Stephen B. Burbank to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 3-10 (Feb. 10, 2014),
available at https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=25&so=DESC&sb=commentDueDat
e&po=0&s=burbank&dct=PS&D=USC-RULES-CV-2013-0002. As noted there, the Committee’s
2013 proposals, which, as revised became effective in 2015, “represent[ed] the seventh set of (nonstylistic) proposed reforms since 1980.” Id. at 10.
27 See, e.g., EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RULES (2009), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf;
Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost and Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions,
90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1103–11 (2012) (discussing 2009 FJC study); id. at. 1111 (“Nearly every effort to
quantify litigation costs and to understand discovery practice over the last four decades has reached
results similar to the 2009 FJC study.”).
28 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Complexity of Modern American Civil Litigation: Curse or Cure?,
91 JUDICATURE 163 (2008).
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between “facts” and “conclusions” that the drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules
had rejected when crafting Rule 8, and (2) transforming the 12(b)(6) motion
from a vehicle for testing the viability of the plaintiff ’s legal theory into a
means to weed out complaints that, shorn of conclusions, do not set forth
sufficient facts to make the plaintiff’s claim “plausible.”
In order that defendants in a massive antitrust case might be spared
impositional discovery,29 in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,30 the Supreme
Court made it more difficult for plaintiffs in such cases to survive a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The case involved
an antitrust conspiracy complaint brought as a class action under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act against the regional telecommunications service providers
that remained after the breakup of AT&T. Reversing a panel of the Second
Circuit, the Court “retired” the language in Conley v. Gibson that “a complaint
should not be dismissed . . . unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts . . . which would entitle him to relief.”31 Agreeing,
however, with Conley that a complaint must give “fair notice of what the . . .
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,”32 and emphasizing Rule 8’s
requirement that the statement of claim “show[] that the pleader is entitled
to relief,” the Court interpreted the former as requiring “more than labels and
conclusions,”33 and the latter as requiring that its “[f]actual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]”34 The Court
then held that for a Section 1 Sherman Act claim these standards “require[d]
a claim with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an
agreement was made.”35 Disregarding direct allegations of conspiracy as
conclusory, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ claims were not plausible
because they rested on allegations of “parallel conduct and not on any
independent allegation of actual agreement among [defendants].” 36
In decisions after Conley v. Gibson, the Court had insisted that pleading
practice is not the appropriate way to challenge the factual sufficiency of a
29 Judge Easterbrook deployed the concept of “impositional discovery” in an article on which
the Twombly Court relied heavily. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 633,
637–38 (1989) (defining “an impositional request” as “one justified by the costs it imposes on one’s
adversary rather than by the gains to the requester derived from the contribution the information will
make to the accuracy of the judicial process”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007).
30 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.
31 355 U.S. at 45–46; see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 (“[T]his famous observation has earned its
retirement”).
32 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47).
33 Id.
34 Id. See id. n.3; id. at 557 (“The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly suggesting
(not merely consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the
‘plain statement’ possess enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”).
35 Id. at 556.
36 Id. at 564.
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plaintiff ’s claim, which is a task for summary judgment, after the plaintiff has
had the opportunity for discovery.37 In retrojecting the gate-keeping function
to the pleading stage, the Twombly Court appears to have been influenced by
the experience it had developed in policing inferences in antitrust conspiracy
cases at later stages. Whether at trial (via a motion for judgment as a matter
of law), or on a pretrial motion for summary judgment, the question whether
plaintiff had a plausible claim of a proscribed agreement could be tested (1)
under substantive law making clear that evidence of parallel conduct by itself
is not enough to sustain a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and (2)
against a factual record.38 Moreover, although the majority and dissent in
Twombly disagreed about the discovery-management ability of district
judges,39 Twombly was undoubtedly a case in which discovery could be very
expensive. These and other considerations prompted speculation that
Twombly’s domain might be limited, whether only to antitrust cases or to cases
portending similarly costly discovery.40
Not for long. Two years later, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,41 the Court again
expressed concern about the costs of discovery—but this time the costs of
diverting the time and attention of high government officials asserting

37 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-13 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993).
38 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554 (“Accordingly, we have previously hedged against false
inferences from identical behavior at a number of points in the trial sequence);” id. at 561 n.7;
Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954); Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
39 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (noting “common lament that the success of judicial supervision
in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side”). See id. at 596-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“[I]t is only a lack of confidence in the ability of trial judges to control discovery, buttressed by
appellate judges’ independent appraisal of the plausibility of profoundly serious allegations, that
could account for this stark break from precedent.”)
40 In dissent, Justice Stevens observed that “[w]hether the Court’s actions will benefit only
defendants in antitrust treble damages cases, or whether its test for the sufficiency of a complaint
will inure to the benefit of all civil defendants, is a question that the future will answer.” Id. at 596
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Contemporary commentary asserted:

More probably, Twombly is an exercise in strategic ambiguity that empowers the lower
federal courts to tighten pleading requirements in cases or categories of cases that
augur similar discovery burdens (or are otherwise disfavored), while preserving
deniability in the Court through the use of its discretionary docket to correct perceived
excesses (as in Erickson).
Editorial, The Devil in the Details, 91 JUDICATURE 52 (2007). The reference is to Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), a case decided a few weeks after Twombly (without argument and per
curiam) in which the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit’s affirmance of a judgment dismissing a
prisoner’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).
41 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
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qualified immunity.42 The case involved some of the claims brought by a
citizen of Pakistan whom federal officials arrested after the 9/11 attacks and
who was subsequently transferred to the (federal) Metropolitan Detention
Center in Brooklyn, New York (MDC), pending trial on charges of fraud in
connection with identification documents to which he ultimately pleaded
guilty, leading to his removal to Pakistan. The complaint alleged that Iqbal’s
seven-month confinement in highly restrictive conditions at MDC resulted
from unlawful racial and religious discrimination. It asserted that Robert
Mueller, the Director of the F.B.I., and John Ashcroft, the Attorney General
of the United States, adopted and/or approved policies and directives
pursuant to which Iqbal was confined, policies and directives that
purposefully discriminated on the basis of religion and race.43
According to the dissent of four justices—including the author of the Court’s
opinion in Twombly and another justice who joined that opinion—the Court in
Iqbal inconsistently treated some of the complaint’s assertions as factual
allegations and others as conclusions.44 The Court also disregarded direct
allegations of intentional discrimination, notwithstanding Rule 9(b)’s assurance
that “[m]alice, intent, knowledge and other conditions of a person’s mind may
be alleged generally.”45 That move enabled the Court to assess the plausibility of
the inferential basis for the theory of the plaintiff’s case.46 Relying on “judicial
experience and common sense,”47 the Court found the complaint implausible.
Because the Federal Rules are transsubstantive, the Court was constrained to
make clear that its approach applies across the board—that Twombly cannot be
confined to its substantive context (antitrust) or according to some other
criterion (e.g., cases with heavy discovery burdens).48
2. Evaluating the Court’s Decisions: Normative Concerns
There is a vast normative literature on the Court’s decisions in Twombly and
Iqbal. It started shortly after the former was decided, when the extent of the
Court’s changes in pleading doctrine was unclear, and proliferated after the latter
42 See id. at 685–86. But see id. at 700 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Neither the briefs nor the Court’s
opinion provides convincing grounds for finding these alternative case-management tools
inadequate, either in general or in the case before us.”).
43 See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 147-49, 165, 174-76 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
44 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 698–99 (Souter, J., dissenting).
45 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686–87. One line of criticism was that the Court’s
interpretation of Rule 9(b) betrays the original understanding and is otherwise “patently
unsupportable.” A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Conditions of the Mind Under Rule 9(b), 41 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1015, 1016 (2020).
46 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681–83.
47 Id. at 679.
48 See id. at 684.
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was decided, when the fears of Twombly’s critics and the dreams of its supporters
seemingly had been confirmed. It appears to us that critics far outnumber
supporters among academics (as opposed to practitioners) writing about these
decisions and that the criticisms include a number of identifiable themes.49
One theme focuses on the Court’s embrace of distinctions—among
“facts,” “conclusions,” “legal conclusions,” and “threadbare allegations”—akin
to those that had bedeviled code pleading. In the view of critics, changes in
the influences affecting federal litigation that have occurred since 1938 do not
include the logical counterrevolution50 that would have been necessary to
rescue such distinctions from the original Advisory Committee’s indictment
of arbitrariness or from the more serious indictment that they unfairly
impede access to justice.51
Two other themes concern the Court’s turn to plausibility pleading. Once
Iqbal affirmed that the new regime was transsubstantive, and with the
reinterpretation of Rule 9(b) in that case, it became clear that in many cases
plausibility pleading would require courts to assess inferences without the
benefit of either substantive law rules or a factual record. As a result, many critics

49 See David L. Noll, The Indeterminacy of Iqbal, 95 GEO. L.J. 117, 118–20 (2010). A common
theme we do not discuss is a critique based on the illegitimacy of changing pleading law via judicial
decision, given the requirements of the Rules Enabling Act as interpreted in past decisions, and on
the epistemic shallowness of the Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal. See, e.g., Stephen B.
Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 548–49; Stephen B.
Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 116, 118–20
(2009) (hereinafter Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure).
50 See Walter Wheeler Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L. REV.
416, 417 (1921) (arguing that “there is no logical distinction between statements which are grouped
by courts under the phrases ‘statements of fact’ and ‘conclusions of law’”); Robert G. Bone,
Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
849, 862–70 (2010).
51 See Noll, supra note 49, at 120 (discussing critique “that when the defendant controls critical
private information, Iqbal creates an apparent Catch-22 for plaintiffs, requiring them to plead
information they do not know but denying them a means of discovering that information”). As one
of us wrote shortly after Iqbal was decided:

The architecture of Iqbal’s mischief . . . is clear. The foundation is the power the Court
claimed to parse a complaint, accepting allegations of fact as true and ignoring
conclusory allegations, including legal conclusions. In Twombly, the Court ignored
allegations of conspiracy; in Iqbal, notwithstanding Rule 9(b), it ignored allegations of
discriminatory intent. Yet, an important reason why the drafters of the 1938 Federal
Rules rejected fact pleading is that one person’s “factual allegation” is another’s
“conclusion.” The discretionary power of the judge to follow his or her personal
preferences in deciding the plausibility of a complaint is enlarged to the extent that
direct allegations of liability-creating conduct can be thus disregarded.
Burbank, Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, supra note 49, at 115.
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expressed concern that another layer of subjectivity had been added to that
inherent in the enterprise of distinguishing between “facts” and “conclusions.”52
Relatedly, critics of Iqbal regard with skepticism the idea that “judicial
experience and common sense” can serve as a reliable guide in determining
whether a complaint states a plausible claim. Given the lack of a factual record
and, in many cases, of rules that adjudicate inferential force, critics maintain
that the formula portends judicial decision-making that is vulnerable to
unconscious bias. Most prominently mentioned among cases in which such a
dynamic may be in play are those involving civil rights claims, including
claims of employment discrimination.53
One reason may be that some discrimination and other civil rights
decisions are vulnerable to what Professors Kahan, Hoffman and Braman call
“cognitive illiberalism”54 in an article on the dangers of summary adjudication
exemplified by the Supreme Court’s decision in Scott v. Harris.55 That is
because in some discrimination and other civil rights cases one would expect
“Americans [to] interpret th[e] facts against the background of competing
subcommunity understandings of social reality,”56 making them strong
52 ”The assessment of likely trial success that the thick screening model requires is an allthings-considered prediction based on what the complaint tells the judge about the facts and what
the judge knows from her experience about how facts like the ones alleged are usually proved in
similar cases.” Bone, supra note 50, at 873. See also Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of
Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 527–36 (2010).
53 See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 52; Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense: A Social
Psychological Study of Iqbal’s Effect on Claims of Race Discrimination, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. REV. 1, 26
(2011) (arguing that, according to aversive racism theory, “[w]ith no evidence, and relying on
‘common sense,’ courts are more likely to be influenced by automatic stereotypes and implicit
associations about race,” while, lay theories of racism predict that “[u]nder Iqbal’s more rigorous
plausibility standard . . . many federal judges will likely fail to perceive subtle discrimination as
plausibly suggesting unlawful discrimination” and that “White and Black judges will decide motions
to dismiss in ambiguous cases differently”); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA
L. REV. 1124, 1160 (2012); Elizabeth M. Schneider & Nancy Gertner, “Only Procedural”: Thoughts on
the Substantive Law Dimensions of Preliminary Procedural Decisions in Employment Discrimination Cases,
57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 767, 775 (2012–2013) (stating that “there is little difference between the
‘common sense’ and ‘plausibility’ standards that Iqbal and Twombly encourage and the very cognitive
processes that social scientists have identified as producing bias”); Joseph A. Seiner, The
Discrimination Presumption, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1115, 1126-28 (2019). For recent work that
recognizes a possible role for “rules that adjudicate inferential force”—presumptions—in addressing
the problem of implicit bias, see Elizabeth Thornburg, (Un)Conscious Judging, 76 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1567, 1652-53 (2019) (suggesting presumptions for issues where “inferences are particularly
likely to be unreliable because of the limits of generalizations or social stereotypes”). Even without
reference to the problem of unconscious bias, critics saw in Iqbal’s aggressive screening approach a
particular threat to civil rights cases. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 50, at 879.
54 Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman, and Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?
Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 838 (2009). See id. at 896.
55 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
56 Kahan et al., supra note 54, at 887.
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candidates for the operation of cognitive biases that judges may recognize in
others but not in themselves.57 Both plaintiffs and jurors in discrimination
and other civil rights cases will often have “recognizable identity-defining
characteristics” that might cause them to dissent from a view of plausibility
grounded in a judge’s cultural predispositions.58
In his book, The Death of the American Trial, Professor Robert Burns
observes:
Common sense very rarely confronts the level of detailed factual
development that the trial provides. Every time the lawyer says, “Generally
and for the most part . . . .” the other lawyer is likely to say, “Yes, but not
where . . . .” Each new case requires a genuine insight, what Peirce called an
“abduction,” that must seek out the intelligibility inherent in these particular
facts. Paradoxically, by giving particularity and empirical truth their due, the
trial provides a strong critique of commonsense generalizations . . . The trial
provides a self-criticism of the overgeneralized “scripts” with which much of
our common sense is stored.59

According to some critics of Iqbal, “judicial experience and common sense” is
subject to no such critique.
II. IDEOLOGY AND IDENTITY ON THE COURTS OF APPEAL: THE
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
In this section we review existing empirical research on the relationship
between votes or outcomes in Court of Appeals decisions and judges’
ideology (usually proxied by party of appointing president), gender, and race.
The literature has a patchwork character, with salient and apparently
ideologically divisive issues sometimes the locus of significant associations
between judge characteristics and outcomes, and sometimes not. The
literature is largely bereft of theory explicating the relationship between
specific characteristics and preferences over outcomes across policy domains,
particularly as to judges’ gender and race. As a result, it has proceeded
inductively, mapping the universe of relationships in fields of law that
researchers consider important.
57 See id. at 843 (noting that “[w]e thus simultaneously experience overconfidence in the
unassailable correctness of the factual perceptions we hold in common with our confederates and
unwarranted contempt for the perceptions associated with our opposites”). See also Russell M.
Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1153 (2008) (introducing proposals to
change Title VII jurisprudence in order to “respond in one way or another to judicial intuitions that
(1) discrimination is rare and (2) most outsiders who claim to have suffered discrimination are either
paranoid or strategic”).
58 See Kahan et al., supra note 54, at 898–99.
59 ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 33, 35 (2009).
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A. Party
By now it will surprise few people that measures of judge ideology based,
in whole or in part, on party of appointing president are associated with
decision-making on the Courts of Appeals. The empirical literature
establishing this has focused heavily on civil rights and liberties, and studies
cover a lot of that landscape. They have found that Democratic appointees to
the Courts of Appeals, on average, are more likely to decide in the liberal
direction than Republican appointees in the areas of affirmative action,
employment discrimination, sex discrimination, desegregation, disability
rights, abortion, campaign finance, freedom of expression,60 some types of
religious liberty cases,61 voting rights,62 search and seizure, and obscenity.63
There has been much less work outside of civil rights and liberties, and the
results are more mixed. Researchers have found that judges appointed by
Democrats or with more liberal ideology measures, on average, are more
likely to decide in the liberal direction in the areas of labor, communications,64
and an aggregation of cases between individuals and business.65 However,
studies have found no such differences in some areas that may be regarded as
ideologically salient, such as takings of property rights, punitive damages,
standing, and Commerce Clause challenges to national legislation.66

60 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE
JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 149 (2006)
(evaluating all of these issues); Jonathan P. Kastellec, Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence on
Appellate Courts, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 167 (2013) (evaluating affirmative action cases); Sean Farhang
& Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under
Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299 (2004) (evaluating employment discrimination
cases); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the
Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759 (2005) (evaluating employment discrimination cases).
61 See Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morris, Searching for the Soul of Judicial
Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 595–96
(2004); Sepehr Shahshahani & Lawrence J. Liu, Religion and Judging on the Federal Courts of Appeals,
14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 716 (2017).
62 See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2008).
63 See Donald R. Songer, Sue Davis & Susan Haire, A Reappraisal of Diversification in the Federal
Courts: Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals, 56 J. POL. 425 (1994).
64 See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 151.
65 See SUSAN B. HAIRE & LAURA P. MOYER, DIVERSITY MATTERS: JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING
IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 47-48 (2015) (For Haire and Moyer, “distributive politics” is defined
as suits between individuals and business, and they exclude discrimination cases). Other work finds
Court of Appeals judges’ votes to be associated with party of the appointing president when cases are
pooled across a large number of policy areas including both civil rights and non-civil rights cases. See
LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES, AND RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL
JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE ch. 4 (2013).
66 See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 149, 151.
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B. Gender and Race
The study of gender and racial diversity on the federal bench is often tied
to issues of representation. Pitkin’s distinction between descriptive and
substantive representation highlights two goals that diversity on the bench
can serve.67 Descriptive representation is concerned with whether an
institution of governance mirrors, in salient respects, the composition of the
community that it governs. Substantive representation, in contrast, is
concerned with whether government actors, in their decision-making, actually
represent the distinctive preferences or interests of a community that they
are associated with.68
Advocates of gender and racial diversity on the bench have long argued
that a value of judicial diversity is to create a bench that descriptively reflects
the polity, which itself can promote the judiciary’s appearance of impartiality
and enhance its democratic legitimacy.69 But they have also argued that
women and members of racial minorities have distinct preferences in at least
some policy domains, and that in particular they are, on average, more
sensitive than white men to issues of discrimination and inequality.70 The
primary reason given for this view is that women and members of racial
minorities are more likely to have seen or been subjected to discrimination,
and these life experiences make the judges more likely to believe a plaintiff ’s
claims of discrimination or other status-based injury and to empathize with
such plaintiffs.71
1. Gender
The empirical literature on the Courts of Appeals suggests that judges’
gender is consequential to their decision-making in a much narrower range
of cases than may have been expected by some advocates of gender diversity
on the bench. A series of studies has found that women judges vote in a more

HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967).
See id. at 80, 184.
See HAIRE & MOYER, supra note 65; Allison P. Harris & Maya Sen, Bias and Judging, 22
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 241, 247 (2019); Susan Moloney Smith, Comment, Diversifying the Judiciary:
The Influence of Gender and Race on Judging, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 179, 198 (1994); Carl Tobias,
Commentary, The Gender Gap on the Federal Bench, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171, 177 (1990).
70 See HAIRE & MOYER, supra note 65, at 6, 13–114; Theresa M. Beiner, What Will Diversity on
the Bench Mean for Justice?, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 113 (1999); Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein &
Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389 (2010);
Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 405 (2000).
71 See, e.g., HAIRE & MOYER, supra note 65, at 32, 48; Boyd et al., supra note 70; Ifill, supra note
70; Joy Milligan, Pluralism in America: Why Judicial Diversity Improves Legal Decisions About Political
Morality, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1206 (2006).
67
68
69
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pro-plaintiff direction, and/or the presence of a woman on a three-judge panel
is associated with more pro-plaintiff outcomes as compared to all male panels,
in employment discrimination cases.72
Other than the discrete policy area of employment discrimination and our
study of class certification (which we discuss later in this section), the
literature on the Courts of Appeals has generally found that gender is not
associated with Court of Appeals judges’ votes or panel outcomes.
Researchers have reported that gender is not associated with votes or
outcomes in the areas of environmental protection, federalism, piercing the
corporate veil, the Contracts Clause, or the Takings Clause.73 They have
likewise found that gender is not associated with Court of Appeals judges’
voting behavior when one pools a large set of policy areas that can be
characterized on a left-right spectrum.74 Null results with respect to judges’
gender also extend into domains of civil rights and liberties without explicit
gender content, including campaign finance, capital punishment, disability
rights, race discrimination in employment,75 affirmative action,76 voting
rights,77 religious liberty,78 search and seizure, and obscenity.79
Finally, the null results with respect to judges’ gender extend into some
domains with quite salient gender content, including one notable form of
employment discrimination. One study finds that gender is not associated
with votes or outcomes in sexual harassment cases (which occur primarily in
the employment context), or abortion.80 In sum, the employment
discrimination studies revealing gender differences in Court of Appeals
decision-making are islands in a sea of null results.81 This is the dominant
view in the literature.82
72 See Boyd et al., supra note 70; Farhang & Wawro, supra note 60; Peresie, supra note 60;
HAIRE & MOYER, supra note 65; Songer et al., supra note 63.
73 See Boyd et al., supra note 70.
74 See HAIRE & MOYER, supra note 65, at 47; SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 167, 171, 185, 197.
75 See id.
76 Kastellec, supra note 60, at 178.
77 See Cox & Miles, supra note 62, at 43–45.
78 See Sisk et al., supra note 61, at 593.
79 See Songer et al., supra note 63, at 433.
80 See Boyd et al., supra note 70; but see Peresie, supra note 60 (reaching a contrary conclusion
with respect to sexual harassment cases).
81 See Burbank & Farhang, Politics & Identity, supra note 3.
82 Surveying the literature on gender and judging, and reporting the results from a large-scale
study in which they find gender associated with outcomes in employment discrimination claims
based on gender, Haire and Moyer conclude that “issues of sex discrimination” are “[t]he single
exception” to the general rule that “women judges . . . decide cases similarly to their male
colleagues.” HAIRE & MOYER, supra note 65, at 48. See also Christina Boyd & Adam Rutkowski,
Judicial Behavior in Disability Cases: Do Judge Sex and Race Matter?, 8 POL., GROUPS, AND
IDENTITIES 834, 837-38 (2020) (“[A] relatively large number of empirical studies . . . have failed to
find evidence that female and male judges decide cases differently from one another, particularly
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Why is employment discrimination different? Scholars have been left to
speculate. Boyd, Epstein and Martin, in their noted study covering thirteen
issue areas but finding gender significant in only one (employment
discrimination based on gender), hypothesize that women vote differently, and
influence men on three-judge panels, in domains in which they “possess
unique and valuable information emanating from shared professional experiences.”83
We have cautioned that none of these studies reporting null results for
gender separately analyzed panels in which women were in the majority. As
a result, it is not possible to be confident whether null results in any given
policy domain (or aggregation of them) indicate that women do not have
different preferences than men, or that women in the minority (where the
bulk of their votes are cast) are not influencing panel outcomes on majoritymale panels and are suppressing their dissents.84 In a study of class
certification, we find that one woman on a panel is not associated with
increasing the probability of certification, but two women are, showing that
in some domains women judges’ preferences become visible, and are
differentially associated with outcomes, only when they are in the majority.85
2. Race
Studies finding Court of Appeals judges’ race to be significantly
associated with votes and outcomes have occurred across a notably broader
range of issue areas than gender, and such findings have often occurred in
studies reporting null results for gender in the same data. Researchers have
reported that African American judges were associated with pro-plaintiff
voting and/or outcomes in voting rights cases,86 affirmative action cases,87
employment discrimination claims based on race,88 religious liberty claims,89
and death penalty cases.90 Not all studies focused on civil rights have found

outside of issue areas that are not closely related to ‘women’s issues’ like sex discrimination.”);
Jonathan P. Kastellec, Race, Context and Judging on the Courts of Appeals: Race-based Panel Effects in
Death Penalty Cases, 41 JUST. SYSTEM J. 1, 2 (2020) (“[T]he addition of a woman to a panel increases
the probability that men will vote for the plaintiff in sex discrimination cases, but makes no
difference in cases not related to gender. . . . . In sum, judges tend to influence each other in areas
of the law where we would expect such influence to occur.”).
83 Boyd et al., supra note 70, at 391–92, 398, 401; see also Christina Boyd, Representation on the
Courts? The Effects of Trial Judges’ Sex and Race. 69 POL. RES. Q. 69, 789-90 (2016); Boyd &
Rutkowski, supra note 82.
84 See Burbank & Farhang, Politics & Identity, supra note 3, at 250, 267–68.
85 See id. at 261–63.
86 See Cox & Miles, supra note 62, at 30, 43 (also reporting null results for gender).
87 See Kastellec, supra note 60 (also reporting null results for gender).
88 See HAIRE & MOYER, supra note 65, at 28–32.
89 See Sisk et al., supra note 61 (also reporting null results for gender).
90 See Kastellec, supra note 82.
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race effects, however. Studies have found that non-white judges are not
associated with more pro-plaintiff rulings in employment discrimination cases
where the data were not restricted to race claims.91 Two find that African
American or non-white judges do not vote more liberally when all cases are
pooled across a wide range of civil issues that can be classified on a liberalconservative spectrum.92 Still, as compared to gender, scholars have observed
that the scope of the empirically discernable association between judges’ race
and their decision-making appears to be broader, traversing more issue areas.93
C. Procedural Law and Access to Justice
The judicial behavior literature on the Courts of Appeals has almost totally
ignored access to justice issues, by which we mean rules affecting opportunities
and incentives to enforce substantive rights through litigation. That is a
problematic omission. If it is important to understand the relationship between
ideology and diversity among Courts of Appeals judges and disposition of cases
asserting rights of high public salience, it is equally important to understand
the impact of the same factors on whether plaintiffs seeking to enforce those
rights will have effective access to court in order to do so.
An empirical study examining the relationship between access to justice
and judicial behavior entails a shift in how to conceptualize the unit of
interest. In a conventional study of Title VII cases, for example, the
researcher identifies a sample of cases in which the plaintiff is asserting a Title
VII claim. Scholars are rarely clear regarding what cases qualify for inclusion
other than the presence of the requisite type of claim. In particular, they often
don’t make clear whether procedural or other threshold issues, which can be
dispositive, are included.94 The key point is that the unit of analysis in most
existing studies is defined by the claim (Title VII), and the data aggregate
appeals of decisions rendered by the trial court throughout the stages of
litigation (dismissal, summary judgment, post-trial motions, etc.).

See Farhang & Wawro, supra note 60; Peresie, supra note 60.
See HAIRE & MOYER, supra note 65, at 28–32; EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 65, at 167, 171, 185, 197.
See Boyd & Rutkowski, supra note 85, at 837–38 (theory and evidence predict that African
American judges will be more pro-civil rights in general, and more likely to support disadvantaged
groups, including disability benefits claimants); Boyd, supra note 83, at 789-90 (discussing theoretical
accounts of case types that may be associated with judges’ gender and race); Kastellec, supra note 82.
94 For an exception in which researchers included procedural rulings and were explicit about
it, see Shahshahani & Liu, supra note 61, at 723 (“Our object is to gauge the attitude of judges to
religious liberties claims, and there is no reason to think that this attitude becomes uninteresting or
entirely different when the issue before the court is procedural. Quite the opposite, we know that
judges use procedural doctrines to achieve substantive outcomes they desire.”). This study, however,
provided no separate analysis of procedural issues, and thus it does not allow inferences about
whether their outcomes were associated with judge characteristics.
91
92
93

2021]

Politics, Identity, and Pleading on the U.S. Courts of Appeals

2151

When studying access to court, the criterion for inclusion is the nature
and posture of the issue presented in a way that crosscuts substantive claims.
In our prior study, the question was whether to certify a class under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23. In this study the question is whether, under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the case should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim without the opportunity to gather evidence in
discovery. In both studies, data are aggregated across substantive claims. This
research design allows one to evaluate whether judge characteristics such as
party of the appointing president, gender and race are associated with voting
behavior and outcomes in the discrete access to justice issue studied.
The conventional approach to claim aggregation contains an implicit
assumption that procedural posture does not matter. Our approach takes
seriously the idea that, independently of judges’ policy preferences over fields
of policy (e.g., environmental, anti-trust, voting rights), the nature of the
procedural question may have a distinctive relationship to judicial
preferences. The fact that two types of judges do not differ on whether to
overturn jury verdicts in some policy domain(s) doesn’t mean that they will
not differ on whether to dismiss claims before discovery.
Our recent study of class certification illustrates how this approach can
reveal relationships that are absent from the picture painted by the empirical
literature on judges’ ideology, race and gender that aggregates claims across
all procedural postures, reviewed above. We analyzed Court of Appeals panel
decisions addressing whether or not to certify a class under Rule 23. We found
a very strong association between the political party of the appointing
president and certification votes and outcomes, with all-Democratic panels
yielding pro-certification outcomes at nearly triple the rate of all-Republican
panels over about the past twenty years. 95
The study also shows that racial and gender diversity on panels is
consequential to certification, although we discern important differences
between the race and gender dynamics on panels. The presence of a single
African American on a panel, relative to none, increased the probability that
the panel would yield a pro-certification outcome.96 In notable contrast, the
presence of a single woman on a panel, relative to none, was not associated with
an increased probability of a pro-certification outcome, but the presence of two
women was.97 Panels addressing whether a class should be certified appeared to
operate on a majoritarian basis with respect to gender but not race.
In addition, we found that the higher levels of pro-certification outcomes
on panels with one African American and with two women were not driven
95
96
97

See Burbank & Farhang, Politics & Identity, supra note 3, at 260–61.
See id. at 264-65.
See id. at 264-65.
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by discrimination claims or civil rights claims more broadly. They remained
present when analysis was restricted to non-civil rights claims.98 Contrary to
the dominant view in the literature, gender and race were associated with
outcomes outside the area of discrimination and civil rights more broadly.
These results motivate us to further explore the effects of diversity on
transsubstantive procedural law affecting access to court. We now turn to an
empirical analysis of pleading decisions.
III. DATA, MODELS, AND ANALYSIS
A. The Data
We collected cases in which the Courts of Appeals reviewed district court
decisions on whether to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6). We excluded pro se cases and cases in which the court applied a
heightened pleading standard required by rule or statute. We drew a random
sample of 700 cases from the full universe of cases between the Iqbal decision
and the end of 2019.99 In this sample 36 percent of cases asserted a civil rights
claim. In order to have sufficient data for separate analysis of discrimination
claims, and all other civil rights clams, we took a random oversample of an
additional 206 civil rights cases (including both discrimination and other civil
rights), and an additional 130 cases asserting discrimination claims.
In the random sample of 700 cases, 35 percent were precedential. Because
we wanted sufficient data for separate analysis of precedential cases, we
collected an additional 942 precedential cases (without any policy area
restrictions) between the Iqbal decision and the middle of 2020. This was all
precedential cases that received general Westlaw headnotes for 12(b)(6)
motions that were not already captured by our random samples. In total, our
See id. at 265-67.
The E-Government Act of 2002 required that federal circuits make even non-precedential
opinions publicly available, allowing them to be included in commercial databases. See Andrew T.
Solomon, Making Unpublished Opinions Precedential: A Recipe for Ethical Problems & Legal Malpractice?,
26 MISS. C. L. REV. 185, 205–06 (2007) (“By 2005, every federal circuit released the full-text of its
unpublished opinions.”). However, recent work finds fewer of certain types of appeals on
commercial databases than the number reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
casting doubt on the U.S. Courts of Appeals’ full compliance with the E-Government Act of 2002.
See Merritt E. McAlister, Missing Decisions, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 1101 (2021). McAllister examined the
nature of missing cases only in the First Circuit, where 67% were criminal and 49% were pro se. Id.
at 1144. Although she does not report the percentage of missing cases with counseled civil plaintiffs,
the forgoing percentages are consistent with the number being zero or miniscule. Although
McAlister’s data does not show non-compliance with the E-Government Act with respect to
counseled civil plaintiffs, such noncompliance cannot be foreclosed without more evidence. Future
empirical investigation will be necessary to reach confident conclusions. Although we have no basis
to conclude that such data is missing, to the extent that it is, it would be missing from our sample.
Finally, we note that this issue is not pertinent to what we report on published cases.
98
99
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dataset includes 1,978 cases. We describe the data in further detail in the
Appendix (Part I) and delineate which sets of cases above are included in
which regressions reported below.
Although the idea is not new, there is growing awareness among scholars
that, when studying the relationship between judge characteristics and their
decision-making, we stand to learn different things from studies of random
samples of all cases and studies of precedential cases.100 The random sample of
mostly nonprecedential decisions will allow us to assess the average effect of
judge characteristics on disposition of the mine-run of 12(b)(6) appeals. It will
answer the question of what the consequences are, on average, of the identity
of the panel for the probability of a plaintiff prevailing on a 12(b)(6) appeal.
Precedential Court of Appeals decisions differ from nonprecedential
decisions in important respects. On average, they are likely to raise more
salient and non-routine legal issues, and they may not be representative of all
litigated cases in other ways.101 In addition to the possible
unrepresentativeness of precedential decisions with respect to judicial
behavior, there may be other important selection processes at play when
analyzing only precedential decisions. The same judges that render
precedential decisions also decide whether the opinion will be precedential,
threatening to confound inferences about the relationship, in general,
between judge characteristics and case outcomes when one studies only
precedential decisions.102 Studies finding a statistically significant
relationship between a judge characteristic and an outcome in precedential
cases may be explained by differences in voting that are confined to salient
cases, or differences in publication behavior, or both, rather than differences
in votes on outcomes in the full universe.
While recognizing this, we are interested, in part, in the influence of the
ideology and identity characteristics of judges, if any, on the creation and
development of law. Precedential Court of Appeals opinions are the vehicle
through which circuits create and develop law that is binding on all
subsequent panels and on all district courts in the circuit, while
nonprecedential decisions are not binding. Even if some judge characteristic
100 See Keith Carlson, Michael A. Livermore, and Daniel N. Rockmore, The Problem of Data
Bias in the Pool of Published U.S. Appellate Court Opinions, 17 J. EMPIR. LEG. STUD. 224, 256 (2020).
101 See id. at 230, 238–254; Sean Farhang, Jonathan P. Kastellec, and Gregory J. Wawro, The
Politics of Opinion Assignment and Authorship on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Evidence from Sexual
Harassment Cases, 44 J. LEG. STUD 59, 70 (2015); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What
Shapes Perceptions of the Federal Court System?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1989); David S. Law, Strategic
Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817
(2005); Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in
the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71 (2001).
102 See Burbank & Farhang, Politics & Identity, supra note 3, at 251; Farhang et al., supra note
101, at 70–71; Carlson et al., supra note 100, at 230–31.
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is not associated with outcomes in the full universe of assigned cases, it may
still influence the direction of law’s development through precedential
opinions in ways that will affect future cases (including mine-run ones). Or
the opposite may be true. Some judge characteristics may be consequential
only when not making law. Thus, if we detect a relationship between a judge
identity characteristic and outcomes in our random sample of 12(b)(6)
motions, only with a parallel model of precedential cases will it be possible to
evaluate whether it extends into the domain of lawmaking.
Finally, including analysis of precedential decisions contributes to
comparison of our results with the leading works in the Court of Appeals
literature on panel effects and diversity, which is based almost entirely on
precedential decisions.103 Unlike that literature, however, we present parallel
models with a random sample of decisions to demonstrate whether and how
results differ across the two sets of cases. We are not aware of any prior study to
analyze both a random sample of cases and precedential cases covering the same
issues, in the same court, and over the same period, allowing direct comparison.
We find that in important respects the results across the two populations of cases
do differ, sometimes in ways that are complex and unexpected.
A number of trial court studies seeking to evaluate the impact of Twombly
and Iqbal either excluded or separately analyzed decisions turning on the legal
sufficiency of a claim as distinguished from its factual sufficiency. The former,
in their view, are unremarkable applications of pleading law that has been with
us since 1938. The latter, they believe, are what plausibility pleading is all
about. And since plausibility pleading was what interested them, they sought
to segregate or exclude decisions grounded on legal insufficiency. These
103 See, e.g., Farhang & Wawro, supra note 60, at 310–311 (analyzing precedential employment
discrimination cases); Boyd et al., supra note 70 (analyzing precedential cases across numerous policy
areas; they analyze data described in SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 18); Cox & Miles, supra
note 62, at 3 (analyzing precedential voting rights cases); Kastellec, supra note 60, at 173 (analyzing
precedential affirmative action cases); Songer et al, supra note 63, at 430 (analyzing precedential
employment discrimination, obscenity, and search and seizure cases); Sisk et al., supra note 61, at
534–35 (analyzing precedential religious liberty cases). But see Kastellec’s recent paper on habeas
death penalty decisions on the U.S. Court of Appeals, supra note 82, which draws on data from
Jeffrey Fagan and James Liebman, Processing and Outcome of Death Penalty Appeals After Furman v.
Georgia, 1973-1995: [United States] (ICPSR 3468) (2006), which endeavored to collect all such
appeals. Carlson et al., supra note 100, at 230-3, observe that reliance on precedential opinions is
dominant in the Court of Appeals literature on judicial behavior in general, not just in studies of
diversity. This reliance on precedential cases by scholars doing work on periods before about 2002
was largely a function of necessity. Before the E-Government Act of 2002, neither complete nor
representative samples of nonprecedential cases were accessible on electronic databases. See
Solomon, supra note 99, at 203–215. Thus, studies including whatever nonprecedential cases were on
electronic databases before around 2002 also suffer a significant selection threat analogous to that of
publication. See Carlson et al., supra note 100, at 256; Peresie, supra note 60, at 1767 (including in her
study precedential and nonprecedential employment discrimination cases from 1999-2001 that were
available on Westlaw).
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studies tend to regard legal sufficiency issues, at least in part, as threshold
questions that could lead to dismissal without the court evaluating the merits
of the complaint’s factual allegations under governing substantive law.104
We elect not to take this approach and to simply analyze all 12(b)(6)
appeals. We are not seeking to evaluate whether Twombly and Iqbal changed
the dismissal behavior of judges, and thus isolating factual sufficiency issues
is not necessary to our objectives. Further, our review of a large number of
cases leads us to conclude that the distinction between legal and factual
sufficiency is often highly ambiguous. Some legal sufficiency issues, we
believe, are not threshold issues of the sort excluded by prior studies. And
some threshold issues excluded by prior studies may in fact turn on factual
pleadings that implicate Twombly and Iqbal. We are doubtful that one can
systematically and objectively operationalize a legal sufficiency code in a data
set as large as ours.
Further, when studying the relationship between judges’ characteristics
and their decisions, random assignment is critical to facilitate comparison of
different judge types by allowing us to assume that they are deciding
comparable claims. If the researcher filters out some cases after the random
assignment has occurred based on disposition of threshold issues, selection
may be introduced into the data. If the judge characteristics being studied are
associated with how judges decide threshold legal sufficiency issues, then
when one analyzes only cases in which judges evaluate the factual sufficiency
of the pleadings, there is risk that the two types of judges are not deciding a
comparable set of cases, confounding an inference that the judge
characteristic explains observed difference in voting. Thus, we analyze all
12(b)(6) appeals after Iqbal and leave for future work analysis of the cases at
a more granular level of reasoning.
Our unit of analysis is the claim, not the case. Cases often contain
multiple claims; motions to dismiss are made with respect to claims, and both
district courts and Courts of Appeals regularly conclude that a motion should
be granted with respect to some claims and denied with respect to others. In
order to code it, the court’s Rule 12(b)(6) analysis in each decision was read
in full. The random sample of 700 cases contained evaluation of 1,136 claims
under Rule 12(b)(6) (about 1.6 claims per case). The oversample of 942
precedential cases contained evaluation of 1,794 claims under Rule 12(b)(6)
(about 1.9 claims per case).
104 See Scott Dodson, A New Look at Pleading in Federal Civil Cases, 96 JUDICATURE 127, 131
(2012); Alexander Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L. REV. 2117, 2139
(2015); see also Raymond H. Brescia & Edward J. Ohanian, The Politics of Procedure: An Empirical
Analysis of Motion Practice in Civil Rights Litigation under the New Plausibility Standard, 47 AKRON L.
REV. 329, 335 (2014); Quintanilla, supra note 53, at 33–34.

2156

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 2127

Our dependent variable is whether a decision is pro- or anti-plaintiff. We
code a decision as anti-plaintiff (=0) if the Court of Appeals affirms the trial
court’s grant of a motion to dismiss or reverses the trial court’s denial of a
motion to dismiss. We code a decision as pro-plaintiff (=1) if the Court of
Appeals reverses the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss or affirms the
trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss.
The task of measuring how a judge or panel characteristic may influence
lawmaking is difficult. The most clearly observable manifestation of influence
is a change in the probability that the appellant will prevail. However, much
bargaining and deliberation among judges focuses on how to frame or justify
a decision once it has been determined which party will prevail.105 Such
decisions about framing and justification can have important ramifications for
the actual policy consequences of an opinion for future cases. Although we
believe that our dependent variable captures much that is important to the
development and application of the law governing dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6), we readily acknowledge its limits, which we regard as one cost of a
large-N empirical study, as compared to a qualitative study that examines not
just outcomes but also the scope and implications of reasoning.
This measurement constraint limits the inferences we can make from our
data. If we find that some judge or panel characteristic is not associated with
either pro- or anti-plaintiff decisions, we cannot conclude that the judge or
panel characteristic has no directional influence on opinion content. On the
other hand, flipping an outcome is a very strong form of influence, and thus
to the extent that we find that a judge or panel characteristic is associated
with a decision on dismissal in a particular direction, that characteristic is
likely influencing opinion content in the same direction in more subtle ways.
For each case, we identified the party,106 gender, and race of each judge
using the Federal Judicial Center’s biographical database.107 With respect to
race, we compare non-white judges to white judges.108 The inferences we draw
from the party, gender and race variables are based on the assumption that
case assignment to panels is random, or “as-if ” random, regarding the
relationship between panel composition and the merits of the motion to
dismiss.109 We incorporate a battery of control variables that include a variety
See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 9–14 (1998).
We use party of the appointing president as a proxy for judges’ ideological preferences.
Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789-Present, FED. JUD. CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges [https://perma.cc/8HHF-JYZ9].
108 We are limited by sample size in our ability to analyze smaller racial subsets, such as African
Americans and Hispanics. This is in part because we disaggregate the full data into smaller policy
area subsets, and in part because the low rate of plaintiff wins in the random sample (15%) makes it
difficult to estimate the effects of smaller racial subsets.
109 By “as-if ” random we mean that departures from true random assignment of cases are
inconsequential with respect to anything that would affect the outcomes studied. Levy and Chilton
105
106
107
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of case characteristics, which are detailed in the Appendix (Part II). The
models also contain circuit fixed effects and year fixed effects, the significance
of which is also discussed in the Appendix (Part II).
B. Policy Distribution of the Claims
For all policy areas comprising 2% or more of the data, Table 1 shows the
policy areas of the 1,136 claims underlying the motions to dismiss in our
random sample of 700 cases, and of the 2,184 claims underlying the motions
to dismiss in precedential cases occurring in the random sample and the
oversample of precedential cases combined. The table excludes claims
oversampled in the area of civil rights and discrimination in order that it be
representative of the courts’ 12(b)(6) docket. Because we round the
percentages, the specific policy categories do not sum to 100 percent.
Other civil rights claims (excluding discrimination) will prove important
in our empirical analysis below, and we thus provide additional information
on them. They comprise 25 percent of the claims in the random sample and
31 percent of claims in precedential cases. When the data are collapsed down
to the case level, 25 percent of cases in the random sample assert an other
civil rights claim, and 28 percent of published cases do so. They
overwhelmingly are constitutional claims against government. The three
largest types of claims in this category are (1) policing, (2) public
employment, and (3) prisoner. In the large residual category under other civil
rights, the next largest seven areas are (4) judicial or prosecutorial
misconduct, (5) education, (6) guns, (7) speech and religion, (8) family
relations (primarily constitutional claims to parental rights), (9) voting and
elections, and (10) privacy.110 These ten policy areas are 89 percent of claims
in the other civil rights category. Seventy-one percent of other civil rights
report the results of an empirical study finding small differences in the frequency with which circuits
constituted panels with particular partisan configurations, such as panels with one Republican, or
panels with two Democrats, relative to a scenario in which all panels were constituted purely by
random draws from the circuit’s slate of eligible judges. They suggest that such departures from
randomness may arise from considerations of workload or judges’ scheduling needs. See Adam S.
Chilton & Marin K. Levy, Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2015). The validity of inferences from our judge-characteristic
variables do not depend on the assumption of random assignment of judges to panels, but rather on
the assumption of random assignment of cases to panels once they are constituted. That is, we
require the assumption that, for example, panels with two women, or panels with three Democrats,
are not more likely to be assigned cases with stronger bases to deny the motion to dismiss. See
Deborah Beim, Tom S. Clark & Benjamin E. Lauderdale, Random Assignment to Death 4 (Jan. 29,
2019) (unpublished manuscript).
110 Freedom of speech and religious liberty claims made by prisoners and public employees
were coded as prisoner and public employment. Many public employment claims assert First
Amendment rights.
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claims are section 1983 damages actions. This is a large, cross-cutting, and
important segment of the Court of Appeals 12(b)(6) docket.
Table 1: Policy Areas of Claims Underlying 12(b)(6) Decisions

Random

Precedential

Civil Rights
All Anti-Discrimination
(race, gender, age, etc.)
Employment discrimination
Education discrimination
Other discrimination
(housing, voting, etc.)
All Other Civil Rights
Policing
Public Employment
Prisoner
Other
Non-Civil Rights
Consumer
Contract
Labor
Personal Injury
Antitrust
Securities
Insurance
Intellectual Property
Other

13%

11%

10%
___

6%
2%

2%

2%

25%

32%

9%
5%
2%
9%

11%
3%
5%
12%

62%

57%

15%
12%
7%
7%
2%
___
2%
2%
14%

10%
8%
9%
6%
3%
3%
2%
2%
14%

C. Panel Effects
Our approach to the design of the statistical models presented in the next
section is to assess the relationship between panel characteristics and claim
outcomes rather than the relationship between an individual-level judge
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characteristic and that judge’s votes. There is a dissent rate of 2% in our cases,
and thus outcomes are extremely highly correlated with votes. The literature
shows that when Court of Appeals judges’ party, gender, and race are
associated with votes, their primary explanatory power is at the panel level,
meaning that the composition of the panel often explains more variation in
judges’ votes than their own individual characteristics. For example, in many
policy areas a Democratic appointee votes more liberally when sitting with
two other Democratic appointees as compared to when sitting with two
Republican appointees. The key point is that Court of Appeals judges’
preferences (measured by characteristics) may influence outcomes by the way
they influence the votes of co-panelists.111
The theoretical literature seeking to explain panel effects is built on the
empirical fact that Court of Appeals panels are overwhelmingly unanimous
even while we observe significant variation in case outcomes associated with
panel composition.112 On one account, unanimity may be driven by dissent
avoidance by panel-minority judges who disagree with panel majorities but
do not dissent because of workload pressures, strong norms against dissent,
or the loneliness of dissent. These factors could lead to suppression of
dissents on panels on which there is sincere disagreement, and the panelmajority view prevails without being influenced by the panel minority.113 We
use the phrase “panel minority” to refer to a minority position on a panel that
has divided preferences, regardless of whether the judge is in a majority or
minority group on the circuit.
Alternatively, the literature teaches, unanimity may be driven by panel
minorities not dissenting because they are able to affect decisions.
Mechanisms of influence include deliberation and bargaining, which allow
panel minorities to change the preferences and/or votes of panel majorities.114
As applied to minority-group judges, this view yields more positive
normative implications than if they were suppressing dissents. It would allow
minority-group preferences, when they differ systematically from majoritygroup preferences, to shape the application and development of law even
when they are in the panel minority. By “minority group” we refer to groups
of judges that are a numerical minority on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, such
as women and nonwhites, regardless of their numbers in the general
population. Multiple studies focused on civil rights cases have found that a
single woman or racial minority can influence the votes of men and whites.115

111
112
113
114
115

See Burbank & Farhang, Politics & Identity, supra note 3, at 240, and sources cited therein.
See id. at 243, and sources cited therein.
See id. at 244–-45, and sources cited therein.
See id. at 246-49, and sources cited therein.
See id. at 249, and sources cited therein.

2160

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 2127

Our recent study of class certification, however, shows that this is not always
true. We found that one woman on a panel had no statistically discernable
effect on the likelihood of a pro-certification outcome, but two women had a
large effect in the pro-certification direction.116
D. Statistical Models
In our panel-level outcome model, the unit of analysis is the claim. In
each case, we measure panel effects with dichotomous variables indicating
whether the panel contained zero, one, two, or three Democrats; zero, one,
two, or three women; and zero, one, two, or three racial minorities. Panels
with three Democrats, panels with three men, and panels with three white
judges are the reference categories for the party, gender, and race panel
variables. This allows us to evaluate, for example, whether panels with one,
two, or three Republicans have a statistically distinguishable probability of
pro-plaintiff outcomes from an all-Democratic panel (the reference category),
and if so, by what margin. All of the logistic regression models of pro-plaintiff
outcomes reported in the Appendix (Part VI) contain the full set of these
party, gender, and race panel variables and all of the control variables
enumerated in the Appendix (Part II).
In the models presented in this section we impose the restriction of
analyzing only cases in which at least one plaintiff is an individual person (or
class of them), and at least one defendant is a business or governmental
entity.117 Seventy-eight percent of the claims in our random sample of 700
cases meet this criterion—95% of civil rights claims and 68% of non-civil
rights claims. Most commonly, claims not meeting this criterion are business
against business, or business against government. The dominant concerns
about Twombly and Iqbal have focused on the pleading challenges faced by
individuals suing business (as in Twombly) and government (as in Iqbal). Such
cases are at the heart of our wider empirical investigation of judicial behavior
and access to justice in the federal system. Further, this party structure
restriction creates a much more plausible basis for testing preferences arrayed
on a liberal/conservative continuum. For example, business against business
commercial disputes are not often associated with expectations that judges’
ideology, gender, or race will matter.
We report models: (1) combining all policy areas, and of (2)
discrimination claims, (3) all other civil rights claims, and (4) non-civil rights
claims. For each of these policy groupings, we run separate models for a
See id. at 261.
In the Appendix (Part III) we discuss models of all cases regardless of the party structure
of the suit. Suits against individual persons for conduct undertaken on behalf of a
business/government were coded business/government defendant cases.
116
117

2021]

Politics, Identity, and Pleading on the U.S. Courts of Appeals

2161

random sample of (mostly non-precedential) cases, and for precedential cases.
Table 2 shows plaintiffs’ win rate in 12(b)(6) appeals with an individual suing
business or government in each of the four policy groupings.
Table 2: Claim-Level Plaintiff Win Rate in 12(b)(6) Appeals, with Individual
Suing Business or Government

Random Sample
All Cases
Civil Rights, Discrimination
Civil Rights, Other
Non-Civil Rights

15%
16%
15%
14%

Precedential Only
31%
37%
30%
28%

In the random sample of claims by individuals against business or
government, the plaintiff is the appellant 97% of the time. They win rarely—
only 15% of the time.118 Cases decided for the plaintiff are significantly more
likely to be precedential, with about double the plaintiff win rate. In the
random sample, we see no meaningful variation in win rates across the
subcategories of discrimination, other civil rights, and non-civil rights. In
precedential cases, plaintiffs are most successful in discrimination claims.
Before turning to the results, we note one important limitation. In many
of our models we lack sufficient data to reach confident conclusions about the
association between outcomes and panels with a majority of women or nonwhite judges. This problem is common in various policy subsets of the data
(with fewer observations), particularly in the random sample. The relatively
few observations of majority-women and non-white panels, combined with
the low frequency of plaintiff wins in the random sample (15%), provide an
insufficient basis for confident conclusions about such panels in many of the
policy subset models. At the same time, a number of our models do have
sufficient data to evaluate two-woman and two-racial minority panels—
particularly models pooling all policy areas. Further, all the models can
support strong inferences with respect to a single woman and single nonwhite because such panels are prevalent in the data. One-woman panels
decide 47% of the claims in our random sample, and 45% of precedential
claims. One-minority panels decide 43% of the claims in the random sample,
and 38% of precedential claims.
The limited number of majority-woman and non-white panels in our data
requires an interpretive caution. When panels with one woman or one non118 The numbers are nearly identical (changing by less than one percentage point) when the
full random sample is examined, without party restrictions.
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white judge are not statistically distinguishable from all-male or all-white
panels, and we lack sufficient data to confidently evaluate majority-woman
and non-white panels, there remains an important indeterminacy. This
pattern is consistent with gender and race being unassociated with
preferences, or with women and non-whites having different preferences but
failing to affect outcomes when they are in a minority. Only with sufficient
data to evaluate the preferences of women and non-white judges when in the
majority can we empirically adjudicate among these two possibilities.119
Researchers may disagree about how many claims of a particular panel type
in a model are sufficient to make a null result meaningful, and thus we provide
those details in the Appendix (Part VI).120
In addition to the panel outcome-level models that we discuss below, in
the Appendix (Part V) we also present parallel vote-level models. We only
report as significant results that are robust across the outcome-level and votelevel models and that satisfy other robustness checks described in the
Appendix (Parts IV-V). The Appendix (Part I) also details which samples are
used in each model.
1. Party
RANDOM SAMPLE. All of the party variables are insignificant in the
random sample of cases. This is true for all policy areas combined,121
discrimination claims,122 all other civil rights claims,123 and all non-civil rights
clams.124 Notwithstanding all of the controversy about Twombly and Iqbal, and
the prospect that they would introduce greater subjectivity and ideology into
disposition of 12(b)(6) motions, we detect no party association with outcomes
in the random sample of cases, even when comparing all-Republican to allDemocratic panels.125 Party is consequential, however, in precedential cases.
PRECEDENTIAL CASES. In the model of precedential cases spanning all
policy areas, some party variables are significant.126 Because logit coefficients
are not directly interpretable, we compute predicted probabilities that specific
panel-types will render a pro-plaintiff outcome. All-Democratic panels have
a 38% probability of a pro-plaintiff outcome.127 Adding one Republican
See Burbank & Farhang, Politics & Identity, supra note 3, at 250, 267–68.
Table A-10.
Table A-1, Model C.
Table A-2, Model A.
Table A-2, Model C.
Table A-2, Model E.
Party remains insignificant in alternative specifications of the models reported in notes 121
to 124 that substitute a dichotomous variable comparing Democratic to Republican majority panels.
126 Table A-1, Model D.
127 Table A-5, Model D.
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
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(DDR) is not statistically distinguishable.128 The Democratic majority does
not give ground to one Republican. When Republicans form a majority on
RRD panels, however, the probability of a plaintiff win declines to 24%.129
The variable measuring all-Republican panels is negative and approaches but
does not achieve significance.130 In light of the significance of the DDR
variable, it appears to us that the RRR variable is insignificant because we
have many fewer RRR than RRD panels in the data. In an alternative
specification of an otherwise identical model, we combine RRR and RRD
panels into a Republican majority variable, which is statistically significantly
different from all-Democratic panels (p=.011) with a 26% probability of ruling
for the plaintiff. Subsetting the data by policy area will reveal how this party
association with outcomes is distributed across policy areas.
The party variables are not significant in either the discrimination
model131 or the other civil rights model132 of precedential cases, consistent
with their insignificance in both civil rights models in the random sample.
We also examined a random sample model, as well as a precedential model,
of all civil rights claims (combining discrimination and other civil rights),
significantly increasing the sample size. All the party variables remain clearly
insignificant in both models.133
Together, these null results for party in civil rights claims are contrary to
our expectations, and, we think, contrary to what the literature on Iqbal seems
to anticipate. They are also contrary to what the judicial behavior literature
on the Courts of Appeals (which ignores procedural posture) would lead one
to expect. That literature has found widespread associations between party
and case outcomes across the landscape of civil rights, and we do not doubt
those results. However, it appears that when the question is narrowed to
whether civil rights plaintiffs have stated a claim sufficient to proceed to
discovery, Democratic and Republican appointees decide similarly. This is
true even when the data are restricted to more salient cases that make law
(precedential decisions).
Table A-1, Model D.
Table A-1, Model D; Table A-5, Model D.
Table A-1, Model D.
Table A-2, Model B. We have the least data in our discrimination models. In an alternative
specification, we pooled discrimination claims in the random sample and the precedential model
into an omnibus discrimination model, yielding 614 claims arising in 368 cases. In that model all of
the party variables remained insignificant.
132 Table A-2, Model D.
133 The random sample of combined civil rights claims (discrimination and other) contained
739 claims occurring in 424 cases, and the set of combined precedential civil rights claims contained
915 claims in 465 cases. We examined alternative specifications of these models substituting a
dichotomous variable comparing Democratic to Republican majority panels, and it was consistently
insignificant.
128
129
130
131
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In contrast, in the model of precedential non-civil rights claims some
party variables are significant.134 This non-civil rights category covers about
half the data, with the most common policy areas, in order, being consumer,
contract, labor, personal injury, antitrust, and securities. All-Democratic
panels have a 48% probability of a pro-plaintiff outcome.135 Adding one
Republican (DDR) is not statistically distinguishable.136 The Democratic
majority does not give ground to one Republican. However, when
Republicans form a majority on RRD panels, the probability of a plaintiff
win declines sharply, to 16%.137 As in the precedential model spanning all
policy areas, the all-Republican panel variable is negative and approaches but
does not achieve significance, which we attribute to the limited number of
RRR panels. In an alternative specification in an otherwise identical model,
we combine RRR and RRD panels into a Republican majority variable, which
is statistically significant (p=.002) with a 20% probability of ruling for the
plaintiff. Thus, there is a decline of 28-percentage points in the probability of
a pro-plaintiff outcome moving from an all-Democratic to a majorityRepublican panel.
In sum, party is strongly associated with outcomes in precedential noncivil rights claims, but not precedential civil rights claims. In the random
sample, party is not associated with outcomes in the disposition of 12(b)(6)
appeals either in aggregate or in any of our policy subsets.
2. Gender
RANDOM SAMPLE. Controlling for the partisan and racial composition
of the panel, and the variables listed in the Appendix (Part II), panels with
one woman are significantly more likely to rule for the plaintiff in the random
sample of other civil rights claims (excluding discrimination).138 All-male
panels have a 10% probability of a pro-plaintiff outcome.139 The addition a
single woman panel-affects the two males and increases the probability to
21%,140 about doubling it. This cross-cutting set of civil rights claims
comprises 1 in 4 cases on the Courts of Appeals’ 12(b)(6) docket. Forty-eight
percent of claims in the random sample are decided by panels with one
woman, and thus this result reflects a broad impact of gender on plaintiff’s

Table A-2, Model F.
Table A-6, Model F.
Table A-2, Model F.
Table A-2, Model F; Table A-6, Model F.
Table A-2, Model C. As discussed in the Appendix (Part IV), the result is robust in a model
designed for rare event outcomes.
139 Table A-6, Model C.
140 Table A-6, Model C.
134
135
136
137
138
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access to discovery when the defendant has moved to dismiss in other civil
rights cases.
The variable measuring two-woman panels is insignificant in the model
of other civil rights claims,141 but we lack sufficient data to be confident in
this null result.142 All of the gender variables are insignificant in the other
random sample models—all policy areas combined,143 discrimination
claims,144 and non-civil rights clams.145 We do have sufficient data to be
confident in the null results for panels with two women in the larger model
of all policy areas pooled, but not in the much smaller policy subsets.146
PRECEDENTIAL CASES. Turning to the models of precedential cases, in
other civil rights claims (excluding discrimination) panels with one woman
are again significantly more likely than all-male panels to rule for the plaintiff,
associated with a growth in the probability of a pro-plaintiff ruling from 24%
to 37%.147 The variable measuring panels with two women is insignificant in
this model, but we again have insufficient data to be confident in the null
result.148
Gender is also significant in precedential non-civil rights claims, but only
when women are in the majority. Panels with one woman do not have a
significantly different probability of ruling in a pro-plaintiff direction as
compared to all-male panels, while panels with two and three women do. Allmale panels have a 21% probability of a pro-plaintiff outcome. When women
form a majority sitting with one man, the probability grows substantially to
41%, and on all-woman panels it grows to 58%.149 The model contains only 19
claims decided by all-women panels, and thus we put no stock in this result.
In contrast, the model contains 115 claims decided by panels with two women.
In an alternative specification we created a majority-woman variable (134
claims, arising in 79 cases) and substituted it for the variables measuring two
and three women panels. It was highly statistically significant (p=.004), and
such panels had a 43% probability of a pro-plaintiff ruling, more than double
that of panels with three men.
To evaluate the robustness of the result, we randomly oversampled an
additional 25 cases with non-civil rights claims asserted by individuals against
Table A-2, Model C.
See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text; Table A-10.
Table A-1, Model C.
Table A-2, Model A.
Table A-2, Model E. Panels with two women barely crosses the .1 threshold with a negative
sign, but this result is insignificant in the vote-level model (Table A-4, Model E), and we treat as
significant only results that are significant across our alternative specifications.
146 See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text; Table A-10.
147 Table A-2, Model D; Table A-6, Model D.
148 See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text; Table A-10.
149 Table A-6, Model F.
141
142
143
144
145
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business or government, and decided by majority-woman panels. With the
oversample, the model contains 164 claims arising in 104 cases decided by
majority-woman panels. In the claim-level model with the oversample, the
significance level (.004) and probability of a pro-plaintiff outcome (43%) for
majority-woman panels were the same as those reported in the last paragraph.
In our vote-level analysis yielding the same substantive results, the model
contains 492 votes cast on majority-woman panels.150
All of the gender variables are insignificant, or lack robust significance, in
the other precedential models—when all policy areas are combined,151 and in
the subset with only discrimination claims.152 We do have sufficient data for
confidence in the null result for panels with two women in the larger model
of all policy areas, but not in the much smaller discrimination subset.153
The structure of gender panel effects differs moving from other civil
rights to non-civil rights claims in the precedential models. In the civil rights
context (excluding discrimination), we observed that a single woman changed
the votes of her male colleagues relative to how they vote on all-male panels.
In non-civil rights claims, a single woman on a panel has no discernable
impact on the voting behavior of male colleagues. This is so even though
women judges have much more pro-plaintiff preferences (revealed when they
are in the majority).
It is unclear why one woman affects a male majority in civil rights cases
but not non-civil rights cases, although the literature suggests several
potential (and speculative) explanations. One focuses on intensity of
preferences. Sunstein et al. argue that the impact, if any, of judges in the
preference-minority on a three-judge panel will vary across policy domains
and is less likely to occur when judges have intense preferences, such as
capital punishment and abortion, undercutting the ability of panel-minorities
to influence majorities.154 This view suggests that the presence or magnitude
of panel effects will be negatively associated with the panel-majority’s
See Appendix (Part V).
Table A-1, Model D; Table A-5, Model D. Although the variable measuring panels with one
woman is significant, it is not robust in all alternative specifications discussed in the Appendix (Part
V), in particular the vote-level model with standard errors clustered on case. When the regressions
are disaggregated by policy area (Table A-2), it seems clear that these suggestive results are driven
mainly by other civil rights claims. And while panels with three women are significant across all
models, this is based on only 25 claims arising in 12 cases, and thus the result is not credible.
152 Table A-2, Model B. All gender variables remain insignificant when discrimination claims
from the random sample and precedential models are pooled. See supra note 131.
153 See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text; Table A-10.
154 See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 60, at 62–63, 69–70. Using different methods and
improved data, Professor Fischman finds that there are panel effects in capital punishment and
abortion cases. Joshua B. Fischman, Interpreting Circuit Court Voting Patterns: A Social Interactions
Framework, 31 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 808, 829 (2015). Our point here is conceptual and not about
Sunstein et al.’s specific empirical claims.
150
151
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preference intensity—more intense preferences will be associated with more
majoritarian panel behavior.
Our results for party, discussed above, show that party composition of
panels is not significantly associated with 12(b)(6) dispositions in either
discrimination or other civil rights cases. In contrast, our results for party in
precedential non-civil rights cases show that they are the subject of significant
ideological voting. This is some evidence that many judges have more intense
preferences in non-civil rights cases than in civil rights cases when disposing
of 12(b)(6) appeals. One possibility is that one woman panel-affects male
judges in other civil rights cases because the male judges lack intense
preferences, while a single woman is unable to discernably panel-effect male
majorities in non-civil rights cases, where preference intensity is higher. This
would be consistent with the fact (noted above) that one Republican does not
panel-effect two Democrats in the same non-civil rights model.
Another mechanism offered to explain panel effects is “cue taking.” Cue
taking is a dynamic whereby some judges, seeking an efficient path to
rendering a decision, show greater deference to other judges in issue domains
in which they are perceived to be more credible or expert.155 Studies finding
race and gender panel effects in civil rights cases have proposed cue taking,
or something akin to it, as a possible explanatory mechanism.156 The structure
of gender panel effects that we observe could be explained if male judges
perceive women as more credible or expert in deciding 12(b)(6) appeals in the
area of civil rights, but not more generally.157
Among non-civil rights claims, policy areas comprising more than 2% of
our cases, in order, are consumer, contract, labor, personal injury, antitrust,
securities, and intellectual property. Like our class certification study, the
results contradict conventional wisdom in the literature that women judges’
DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 31 (2002).
See, e.g., Peresie, supra note 60, at 1783–84 (suggesting cue taking as an explanation for onewoman panel effect); Kastellec, supra note 60, at 171–72 (observing that the mere presence of an
African American in an affirmative action case, independent of the content of deliberations, and
independent of her vote, may influence the behavior of whites on the panel); Boyd et al., supra note
70, at 392 n.8 (suggesting the same possibility with respect to gender, and likening this to cue taking).
157 The panel effects literature’s invocation of cue taking in the context of gender is
undertheorized, lacking clear criteria for specifying when a male judge would perceive a woman as
possessing expertise worthy of deference. The cross-cutting set of other civil rights claims is
heterogeneous and does not include claims expressly based on discrimination. To the extent that
gender-based cue taking explains one-woman panel effects in other civil rights cases, the cue taking
is occurring at a very high level of generality, which does not strike us as very likely. In our class
action study we further invoked ideas from the literature on the gender gap in deliberative decisionmaking when considering possible explanations for why one African American panel-affected
white/other judges in the majority, but in the same set of cases women influenced outcomes only
when in the majority. See Burbank & Farhang, Politics & Identity, supra note 3, at 269–72. That pattern
is not present in our pleading data.
155
156
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preferences differ from men’s only in cases implicating discrimination (or
even civil rights more broadly). By shifting the focus to procedural posture
we learn that when making law in non-civil rights claims, women in the
majority exercise gatekeeping powers differently than men. They are more
likely to make law that gives plaintiffs the opportunity to gather evidence in
an effort to prove their claims.
In sum, in other civil rights claims (excluding discrimination), panels with
one woman are materially more likely to rule in a pro-plaintiff direction in
both the random sample and in the precedential model. Majority-woman
panels, but not panels with one woman, are also substantially more likely to
do so in non-civil rights claims in precedential cases, where they are more
than twice as likely to rule for the plaintiff as compared to all-male panels.
3. Race
RANDOM SAMPLE. Controlling for the partisan and gender composition
of the panel, and the variables listed in the Appendix (Part II), in the random
sample of other civil rights cases the variable measuring panels with one nonwhite is highly statistically significant (p=.001), and its magnitude is large.158
The result is consistent with the worries of some of Iqbal’s critics. All-white
panels have an 11% probability of rendering a pro-plaintiff outcome.159 The
probability more than doubles, growing to 25%, when there is one non-white
judge on the panel.160 Viewed conversely, as compared to panels with one
non-white judge, assignment of an all-white panel cuts plaintiffs’ chances of
reaching discovery by more than half. This important cross-cutting category
of civil right cases represents a quarter of the federal appellate 12(b)(6)
docket. Forty-three percent of claims in the random sample are decided by
panels with one non-white, and thus this result reflects a broad impact of race
on plaintiff ’s access to discovery when the defendant has moved to dismiss in
other civil rights cases. The variable measuring panels with two non-white
judges is insignificant, but we lack sufficient data for confidence in the null
results for this panel type.161
All of the race variables are insignificant, or lack robust significance, in
the remaining random sample models—discrimination claims162 (the area in
158 Table A-2, Model C. As discussed in the Appendix (Part IV), the result is robust in a model
designed for rare event outcomes.
159 Table A-6, Model C.
160 Id.
161 Table A-2, Model C; see supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text; Table A-10.
162 Table A-2, Model A. Although the two and three non-white variables are significant in the
claim-level model, neither result is credible. The three non-white variable is based on only six causes
of action in three cases, and thus the result is meaningless. The two non-white result is based on
only 21 cases/26 claims with two non-whites in the model, and this is clearly insufficient to produce
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which some expected race to be especially salient under Iqbal), non-civil
rights claims, and all policy areas pooled.163 With respect to panels with two
non-whites, only the model of cases pooled across all policy areas has
sufficient data to allow confidence in the null results.164
PRECEDENTIAL CASES. In the models of precedential claims, all of the
race variables are insignificant in every model—claims pooled across all policy
areas,165 discrimination claims,166 other civil rights claims,167 and non-civil
rights claims.168 We have insufficient data to be confident in the null results
for panels with two non-whites in any of these models.169
The clear insignificance of the variable measuring panels with one nonwhite judge in the precedential model of other civil rights claims alongside
its strong significance in the random sample is striking. The conventional
wisdom is, we believe, that if voting or outcome variation exists that is
associated with judge characteristics in the full universe of cases, it will be
present in precedential cases in light of their higher salience and legal
consequences. This is an important assumption because, although
nonprecedential cases far outnumber precedential cases,170 the judicial
behavior literature on the Courts of Appeals is based almost entirely on
precedential cases.171 Null results in these studies are regularly understood to
mean that white versus racial minority judges, or men versus women, or
Democrats versus Republicans, are not associated with directionally different
votes or outcomes. Our results show that the assumption underlying this
inference is sometimes false. They highlight a significant risk of inferential

a reliable estimate. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text; Table A-10. Further, the result
becomes insignificant in the vote-level models, which is a key robustness check that we discuss in
the Appendix (Part V). Throughout the paper we report as significant only results that are significant
in both the claim-level and vote-level models.
163 Table A-1, Model C (all cases); Table A-2, Model E (non-civil rights cases). In the original
random sample of 700 cases, panels with two non-whites are significant in these models. However,
these results are based on only 39 cases/62 claims and 24 cases/41 claims with two non-whites,
respectively. To evaluate the robustness of the result we randomly oversampled cases with two nonwhite judges so that we had a total of 115 cases/196 claims and 76 cases/136 claims, respectively. The
two non-white judge variables became clearly insignificant in both models.
164 See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text; Table A-10. When the oversample is added
(discussed in the last footnote), the null result for two non-whites in non-civil rights cases also looks
reliable.
165 Table A-1, Model D.
166 Table A-2, Model B. All race variables remain insignificant when discrimination claims
from the random sample and precedential models are pooled. See supra note 131.
167 Table A-2, Model D.
168 Table A-2, Model F.
169 See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text; Table A-10.
170 See Law, supra note 101; Merrit & Brudney, supra note 101.
171 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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error when drawing general inferences from null results in precedential cases,
as is widespread in the Court of Appeals literature.
Although this result may strike some as counterintuitive, recent empirical
research on differences between precedential and nonprecedential cases
suggests a possible explanation. Carlson, Livermore, and Rockmore find that
single-party panel opinions (all-Democratic or all-Republican) are
overrepresented in the universe of published decisions.172 Grunwald offers a
strategic theory of publication that is consistent with this pattern: “when the
judges cannot reach a compromise [on opinion content], they may exchange
publication for unanimity.”173 On average, panels with heterogeneous
preferences, coupled with the norm of unanimity on the Courts of Appeals,
are characterized by greater need to bargain and compromise,174 and the
question of precedential status may be one element in that compromise.175 A
panel majority may give ground to a panel minority to attain unanimity,
drawing opinion content away from their preferences and making the opinion
less attractive as a vehicle to make law.176
In contrast, when a panel has homogeneous preferences, on average panel
decisions will be closer to the preferences of all members, presenting a better
opportunity to make law. This dynamic would provide an explanation for
Carlson et al.’s finding that single-party panels are overrepresented in
precedential cases. It also offers a plausible explanation for why we observe
panel effects for one-nonwhite sitting in a random sample of (mostly nonprecedential) civil rights cases, but they disappear in precedential cases.
In sum, race is significant in only one model. However, that model is an
important one—the random sample of all other civil rights claims. The presence
of one non-white on a panel more than doubles a plaintiff’s chances of success.
For reasons that are unclear, non-white judges’ pro-plaintiff influence in the
random sample of these cases does not extend to precedential cases.
CONCLUSION
Critics of Twombly and Iqbal worried that the new 12(b)(6) standard would
introduce excessive subjectivity and ideology into disposition of 12(b)(6)
motions. With our data we cannot compare pre-Twombly to post-Iqbal
decision-making, but we can evaluate the degree to which the party (of
172 See Carlson et al., supra note 100, at 239–241; see also Ben Grunwald, Strategic Publication, 92
TUL. L. REV. 744 (2018).
173 See Grunwald, supra note 172, at 759.
174 See Burbank & Farhang, Politics & Identity, supra note 3, at 242–44, 246–49.
175 See Grunwald, supra note 172, at 759.
176 See id. at 760.

2021]

Politics, Identity, and Pleading on the U.S. Courts of Appeals

2171

appointing president), gender and race of panel members are associated with
their disposition of 12(b)(6) appeals in the age of Iqbal. Like the judicial
behavior literature writ large, especially as applied to race and gender, our
results are a patchwork that varies across identity characteristic, policy area,
and random sample versus precedential cases.
In our random sample of cases, judges’ race and gender were associated
with outcomes in other civil rights claims (excluding discrimination), which
are overwhelmingly constitutional claims against governmental actors,
commonly arising in such areas as policing, prisons, and public employment.
In this cross-cutting civil rights category, amounting to a quarter of 12(b)(6)
appeals, panels with one racial minority or one woman are more than twice
as likely, as compared to all-white and all-male panels, to render a decision
favoring a plaintiff ’s opportunity to gather evidence in support of her claim.
Party is clearly insignificant in these models. This is the first Court of Appeals
study that we are aware of in which gender and racial panel composition are
associated with outcomes but party composition is insignificant. Gender and
race are not simply amplifying ideology as measured by party; they are
consequential where party is not. With eighty-six percent of claims in the
data having some degree of gender or racial diversity on the panel, and with
influence on outcomes occurring when women and non-whites are in the
panel-minority, diversity on the Courts of Appeals has a broad impact on
plaintiffs’ ability to reach discovery in other civil rights claims. The remaining
judge characteristic variables in the other random sample models are
insignificant, with the important caveat that we lack sufficient data to evaluate
panels with two women or non-whites in many of the regressions.
The results in precedential cases differ in important respects. Deciding
the case at hand does not exhaust the ways that judges’ preferences shape case
outcomes, and it may not even be the most important way. Law plays an
important role in determining how routine appeals are decided. Indeed, the
substance of law is part of what makes a claim routine—it is unambiguously
covered by a rule. And we found somewhat more associations between judge
characteristics and lawmaking in a pro-plaintiff direction when disposing of
12(b)(6) appeals through precedential decisions.
Democratic panels were significantly more likely to decide in favor of
plaintiffs in precedential non-civil rights cases even though this was not true
in the random sample. In fifty-five percent of precedential cases there are
non-civil rights claims asserted, and thus this party result covers about half
of the data, pooled across many policy areas. Party was insignificant, however,
in precedential discrimination claims and other civil rights claims. Party
therefore was not associated with outcomes in civil rights claims across the
board, in both the random sample and precedential models. Party matters
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least (or not at all) in the policy area in which many scholars (including us)
expected it to matter most: civil rights.
Panels with women in the majority were more likely to decide precedential
non-civil rights claims in favor of plaintiffs, although panels with one woman
were not. In contrast, panels with one woman were more likely to decide other
civil rights claims (excluding discrimination) in favor of plaintiffs. Thus one
woman panel-affected the male majority in other civil rights claims, but not
in non-civil rights claims. Race was insignificant in every precedential model.
In the decade after Iqbal, during which the Courts of Appeals were grappling
with elaboration of notoriously ambiguous pleading doctrine, judges’ ideology
and gender mattered to how they made law. Our models do not detect any race
associations with lawmaking under Iqbal, but we do not claim that our data
forecloses their existence. We lacked the data to evaluate non-white majorities
in precedential civil rights cases (discrimination or other), and we cannot
speak to many more specific issue areas.
Our results for gender, in combination with similar results in our class
certification study, contradict conventional wisdom in the literature that
women judges’ preferences differ from men’s only in cases implicating
discrimination. They add further evidence to the possibility, noted in our
class action study, that transsubstantive procedural law affecting access to
justice may itself be a policy domain in which women have different (more
pro-access) preferences.
Our results also offer some significant lessons about the relationship
between judicial behavior in precedential versus random sample cases,
although the lessons are hard to decipher. What can be said with confidence
is that researchers should be cautious in drawing general inferences about
judicial behavior on the Courts of Appeals from precedential decisions. This
lesson is important because the Court of Appeals literature on judge
attributes is based overwhelmingly on precedential cases, which, in aggregate,
are a small fraction of Court of Appeals decisions.
What is (to us) unexpected is the inconsistency of the relationship. Party
and gender were significant in precedential non-civil rights cases but not in
the random sample. Sometimes a statistically significant relationship exists
in precedential cases when in fact there is no relationship in the full universe.
As a result, existing studies finding significant relationships between judge
characteristics and case outcomes in precedential cases do not warrant the
inference that the relationship exists in the full universe. Such results may be
measuring patterns in salient cases, or publication behavior, or some
combination. We suspect that few will be surprised by this result.
More surprisingly (at first blush), the presence of one non-white on a panel
is strongly associated with plaintiff wins in the random sample of other civil
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rights cases, but clearly insignificant in the precedential model. A judge
characteristic may be insignificant in published cases when in fact a relationship
exists in the full universe. We are aware of no work in the judicial behavior
literature that anticipates this result. A simple and plausible explanation is that
publication is partly a strategic decision to embed legal views in law, and the
white majority may be less likely to give precedential status in cases in which
they make concessions to (are panel affected by) non-white judges.
This result highlights an important caution in interpreting existing Court
of Appeals studies reporting null results for gender and race based on
precedential cases (virtually the entire literature). Such studies have routinely
inferred from null results that no relationship exists between a judge
characteristic and votes or outcomes. They are the basis of the widely held
view that race and gender rarely matter on the Court of Appeals. If we had
collected only precedential cases, we would have reported that race was clearly
insignificant across the board. The results in our random sample of other civil
rights cases show that this would have been error. Null results in studies of
precedential cases cannot support the inference that race and gender are not
associated with decisions in the full universe of cases, although they have been
widely so interpreted. Viewing all the results together, we conclude that the
existing literature, based overwhelmingly on precedential cases, leaves many
more questions unanswered than previously understood.
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APPENDIX
I. SAMPLES USED IN EACH REGRESSION
In Part III.A we describe the samples of 12(b)(6) appeals we collected.
Below we describe which samples were used in each regression reported, and
how many cases the sample contained. This indicates the number of cases
underlying the number of causes of action (the unit of analysis) listed as the
sample size in the regression tables.
- The models designated “Random, All Policy Areas” in Table A-1
(Model A), and “Random, Non-Civ Rts” in Table A-2 (Model E), are
based on the random sample of 700 cases. The former model uses all
such cases, and the latter model uses 271 cases.
- The model designated “Random, Other Civ Rts” in Table A-2 (Model
C) is based on other civil rights claims in (1) the random sample of
700 cases, and (2) the random oversample of an additional 206 civil
rights cases. The model uses 302 cases.
- The model designated “Random, Discrim” in Table A-2 (Model A) is
based on discrimination claims in (1) the random sample of 700 cases,
(2) the random oversample of an additional 206 civil rights cases, and
(3) the random oversample of an additional 130 cases asserting
discrimination claims. The model uses 238 cases.
- The models designated “Preced., All Policy Areas, All Parties” in
Table A-1 (Model B), “Preced., All Policy Areas, Pty Rest” in Table
A-1 (Model D), and “Preced., Non-Civ Rts” in Table A-2 (Model F),
are based on (1) the Westlaw headnote precedential cases, and (2)
precedential decisions in the random sample of 700 cases. There are
1,178 cases in the first model, 852 cases in the second, and 472 cases in
the third.
- The model designated “Preced., Other Civ Rts” in Table A-2 (Model
D) is based on other civil rights claims in (1) the Westlaw headnote
precedential cases, (2) precedential cases in the random sample of 700
cases, and (3) precedential cases in the random oversample of an
additional 206 civil rights cases. The model uses 352 cases.
- The model designated “Preced., Discrim” in Table A-2 (Model B) is
based on discrimination claims in (1) the Westlaw headnote
precedential cases, (2) precedential cases in the random sample of 700
cases, (3) precedential cases in the random oversample of an
additional 206 civil rights cases, and (4) precedential cases in the
random oversample of an additional 130 discrimination cases. The
model uses 151 cases.
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II. CLAIM-LEVEL MODEL SPECIFICATIONS
The unit of analysis in our primary models, discussed in the body of the
Article, is the claim. We ran logit models with standard errors clustered on
case because multiple claims within the same case are not independent of one
another. In all of the statistical models reported below, the following control
variables are included:
- TRIAL COURT OUTCOME: Indicator variable reflecting whether the
trial court granted or denied the motion to dismiss on the claim that
is under consideration by the Court of Appeals.
- TRIAL JUDGE SITTING BY DESIGNATION: Indicator variable recording
whether there was a trial judge sitting by designation on the panel.
- DEFENDANT TYPE: Non-mutually exclusive indicator variables
measuring whether there was a federal defendant, state defendant,
business defendant, or other type of defendant.
- LAW TYPE: Mutually exclusive indicator variables measuring whether
the claim was under federal law, state law, or both.
- POLICY AREA: Mutually exclusive indicator variables reflecting policy
areas comprising 2% or more of the data. Policy areas comprising less
than 2% of the data were aggregated into an “other” policy category.
- CIRCUIT FIXED EFFECTS: Circuit fixed effects (dichotomous variables
for each circuit) account for any time-varying covariates that take the
same value for each judge on a panel within the circuit.
- YEAR FIXED EFFECTS: Year fixed effects (dichotomous variables for
each year) account for any time-varying covariates that take the same
value for each judge on a panel within the year.
Circuit fixed effects account for any variables that change across circuits
and that would take the same value for each judge on a panel within that
circuit, such as circuit doctrine that may have a pro- or anti-dismissal slant
and variation in the size and content of caseloads across circuits. Year fixed
effects account for any variables that change over time and that would take
the same value for each judge on a panel within that year, such as national
trends in caseload, the evolution of Supreme Court doctrine, changing
composition of the Supreme Court, changes in Federal Rules, and salient
features of the partisan or political environment, such as an anti-litigation
posture in a party agenda. They also account for trends over time in attitudes
among male and white judges toward co-panelists who are women and racial
minorities, which may affect the extent to which the former are influenced by
the latter. The circuit and year fixed-effects approach leverages only variation
in the relationship between panel characteristics and outcomes within circuit
and year. This approach allows us to estimate the effects of panel
characteristics most effectively because it controls for the influence of any
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variables that would take the same value for each panel in the same circuit
and each panel in the same year.
III. MODEL INTERPRETATION
In Part III.D of the Article we discuss interpretation of all models except
Models A and B in Table A-1. Those are models, which we discuss here, of all
policy areas combined, but with no party restriction imposed. In the random
sample, all of the party, gender, and race variables are insignificant or not
robustly significant.177 Though the variable measuring panels with two nonwhites is significant, as discussed in Part III.D.3, it is based on insufficient
data to allow confidence in the result, and when we randomly oversample such
panels to address this concern, the variable becomes clearly insignificant.178
In the precedential cases, two of the party variables are significantly
distinguishable from all-Democratic panels.179 All-Democratic panels have a
38% probability of a pro-plaintiff outcome.180 Panels with one Republican
approach but do not achieve statistically significant difference from allDemocratic panels. However, majority-Republican panels (RRD and RRR)
are significantly different from all-Democratic panels, and both are associated
with a 14-percentage point reduction in the probability of a pro-plaintiff
outcome, which they render with a probability of 24%.181
Panels with one woman and panels with three women are both
significantly more likely to render pro-plaintiff outcomes than all-male
panels, but the variable measuring panels with two women is insignificant.182
However, the result for all-woman panels is not meaningful because it is based
on only 39 causes of action arising in 15 cases. All-male panels have a 27%
probability of a pro-plaintiff outcome, and the addition of a single woman
panel-affects the two males and increases the probability modestly, to 33%.183
All of the race variables are insignificant in this model.184
IV. FIRTH MODELS FOR RARE EVENTS
Because plaintiff wins in our random sample are relatively infrequent
(15%), we evaluated the robustness of the significant results in these models

177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184

Table A-1, Model A.
See supra note 164.
Table A-1, Model B.
Table A-5, Model B.
Table A-1, Model B; Table A-5, Model B.
Table A-1, Model B.
Table A-5, Model B.
Table A-1, Model B.
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using Firth logit modes designed for “rare events.”185 Those significant results
were panels with one woman, and panels with one non-white, in the random
sample of other civil rights claims. They are robustly significant at comparable
levels in the Firth models.
V. VOTE-LEVEL MODELS
We only characterize results as significant in the body of the paper if they
are also present in individual vote-level models. An individual vote-level model
of panel effects requires that we disaggregate the party, gender, and race
variables. Our approach is to create variables that capture the identity of the
voting judge and the characteristics of her colleagues on the panel. This requires
that each variable measuring a characteristic (party, gender, race) be
disaggregated into six variables. Table A-9 defines each of the six variables
associated with party, gender, and race panel effects. Although the table is
labored, the information is necessary in order to understand the textured
information conveyed by the regression models. For each set of indicator
variables, we designate the reference category with the “reference” parenthetical.
In the vote-level models reported, we ran logit models with standard
errors clustered on claim because multiple votes on the same claim are not
independent of one another. We also examined alternative specifications with
standard errors clustered on case, and on judge, and obtained consistent
results for results found to be significant across the outcome-level models and
our vote-level models with standard errors clustered on claim.
Because the vote-level models are consistent with the claim-level models,
we do not rehash substantive interpretation of all models. Instead, we
interpret only the significant gender and race results in order to illustrate how
to read the tables. For the gender variables, a man voting on an all-male panel
is the reference category. In the random sample of other civil rights claims,
the variables measuring the votes of a male judge sitting with one man and
one woman, and the votes of a woman sitting with two men, are both
statistically significant.186 These are votes occurring on panels with one
woman. A man voting on an all-male panel has a 12% predicted probability of
ruling for the plaintiff. A man serving with one woman and one man has a
23% probability, and a woman serving with two men has a 27% probability—
about triple that of a man serving on an all-male panel.187

185

See David Firth, Bias Reduction of Maximum Likelihood Estimates, 80 BIOMETRIKA 27–38

(1993).
186
187

Table A-4, Model C.
Table A-8, Model C.
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This one-woman panel effect in other civil rights claims is also present in
the precedential model.188 A male serving on an all-male panel votes in favor
of the plaintiff with a probability of 24%. The probability grows to 38% for
males serving with one man and one woman, and to 41% for one woman
serving with two men.189
Moving to precedential non-civil rights cases, men and women voting on
MMW panels are not statistically distinguishable from men voting on allmale panels.190 However, when women assume a majority in MWW panels,
both the men and women judges are significantly more likely to vote for the
plaintiff as compared to men on all-male panels.191 Men voting on all-male
panels vote in favor of the plaintiff 21% of the time. For men sitting with two
women the probability is 40%, and for women sitting with one man and one
woman it is 39%.192 A woman serving on an all-woman panel votes in a proplaintiff direction with a probability of 54%, but as noted in Part III.D.2 there
are too few such cases (19) to credit this result. In an alternative specification
we pool women’s votes on MWW and WWW panels and find that when
women are in the majority they have a 50% probability of voting in a proplaintiff direction in precedential non-civil rights cases—about two and a half
times the probability for a male on an all-male panel. This result is based on
402 votes on 134 claims arising in 79 cases decided by majority-woman panels.
To evaluate the robustness of the result, we randomly oversampled an
additional 25 cases with non-civil rights claims asserted by individuals against
business or government and decided by majority-woman panels. With the
oversample the model contains 492 votes on 164 claims arising in 104 cases
decided by majority-woman panels. The result is robust in the vote-level model
with the oversample, where the variable measuring a woman voting on
majority-woman panels is significant (p=.007) with a predicted probability of
49%.
For the race variables, a white judge voting on an all-white panel is the
reference category. In the random sample of other civil rights claims, the
variables measuring the votes of a white judge sitting with one white and one
non-white judge, and the votes of one non-white sitting with two white
judges, are both statistically significant.193 These are votes occurring on panels
with one non-white judge. A white judge voting on an all-white panel has a
12% predicted probability of ruling for the plaintiff. A white serving with one
white and one non-white judge has a 26% probability, and a non-white judge
188
189
190
191
192
193

Table A-4, Model D.
Table A-8, Model D.
Table A-4, Model F.
Id.
Table A-8, Model F.
Table A-4, Model C.
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serving with two white judges has a 29% probability—more than triple that
of a white judge serving on an all-white panel.194

194

Table A-8, Model C.
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VI. TABLES

TABLE A-1: LOGIT MODEL OF CLAIM-LEVEL PANEL EFFECTS IN 12(B)(6) OUTCOMES
POOLING ACROSS POLICY AREAS
Model A
Random
All Policy
All Parties

Model B
Preced
All Policy
All Parties

Model C
Random
All Policy
Pty Rest

Model D
Preced
All Policy
Pty Rest

PARTY
3 Democrats (reference)
1 Rep,

-.16

-.28

-.09

-.23

2 Dems

(.35)

(.22)

(.41)

(.25)

2 Reps,

-.17

-.52**

-.27

-.60**

1 Dem

(.39)

(.22)

(.46)

(.26)

.04

-.47*

.20

-.40

(.45)

(.28)

(.54)

(.34)

3 Reps

GENDER
3 Men (reference)
1 Wom,

.22

.25*

.24

.34*

2 Men

(.23)

(.15)

(.26)

(.17)

2 Wom,

-.24

.11

-.41

.37

1 Man

(.34)

(.20)

(.38)

(.25)

-.89

.79*

-1.24

1.41**

(.82)

(.45)

(.87)

(.59)

3 Wom

RACE
3 White (reference)
1 NW,
2 White

.18

.02

.42

.11

(.22)

(.15)

(.27)

(.18)

2 NW,

.81**

.01

1.09**

.10

1 White

(.36)

(.26)

(.45)

(.31)

3 NW

___

-.37
(1.19)

___

-.16
(1.33)

All models include circuit fixed effects, year fixed effects, and independent variables measuring
policy area, direction of the trial court outcome, trial judge sitting by designation, defendant type
(federal government, state government, business, other), and law type (federal law, state law, both).
Random sample models additionally contain a variable indicating whether the case was published.
“Pty Rest” in Models C & D indicates that the models contain only claims in which an individual
(or class or them) sues a business or government defendant.
N=
Pseudo

1,117

2,171

852

1605

.13

.10

.15

.13

R2=

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on case.
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TABLE A-2: LOGIT MODEL OF CLAIM-LEVEL PANEL EFFECTS IN 12(B)(6) OUTCOMES BY
POLICY SUBSET, IN CLAIMS WITH INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS (INCLUDING CLASSES) SUING
BUSINESS OR GOVERNMENT
Model A
Random
Discrimination

Model B
Preced
Discrimination

Model C
Random
Other
Civ Rts

Model D
Preced
Other
Civ Rts

Model E
Random
NonCiv Rts

Model F
Preced
NonCiv Rts

PARTY
3 Democrats (reference)
1 Rep,

.16

-.08

-.12

.11

-.09

-.39

2 Dems

(.56)

(.52)

(.53)

(.47)

(.49)

(.33)

2 Reps,

.17

-.01

-.17

-.20

-.15

-1.17***

1 Dem

(.66)

(.54)

(.59)

(.44)

(.57)

(.38)

-1.23

.27

.63

.26

-.16

-.63

(.86)

(.81)

(.65)

(.54)

(.66)

(.46)

3 Reps

GENDER
3 Men (reference)
1 Wom,

-.35

.07

1.07**

.71**

-.23

.27

2 Men

(.45)

(.50)

(.47)

(.29)

(.40)

(.26)

2 Wom,

.17

-.18

.03

-.10

-.83*

.81**

1 Man

(.50)

(.63)

(.51)

(.40)

(.49)

(.35)

3 Wom

___

.97

1.50

.40

1.07

1.59**

(1.93)

(1.03)

(1.72)

(1.05)

(.65)

RACE
3 White (reference)
1 NW,

.07

.32

1.39***

.11

.22

.23

2 White

(.39)

(.47)

(.43)

(.31)

(.38)

(.24)

2 NW,

1.00*

.09

-.30

-.69

1.00*

.15

1 White

(.54)

(.66)

(.92)

(.51)

(.55)

(.48)

___

___

___

___

3 NW

2.28*
(1.17)

-.18
(1.46)

All models include circuit fixed effects, year fixed effects, and independent variables measuring policy area,
direction of the trial court outcome, trial judge sitting by designation, defendant type (federal government, state
government, business, other), and law type (federal law, state law, both). Random sample models additionally
contain a variable indicating whether the case was published. All models contain only claims in which an
individual (or class or them) sues a business or government defendant.
N=

406

246

507

702

422

789

Pseudo R2=

.24

.17

.30

.19

.14

.15

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on case.
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TABLE A-3: LOGIT MODEL OF VOTE-LEVEL PANEL EFFECTS IN 12(B)(6) OUTCOMES
POOLING ACROSS POLICY AREAS
Model A
Random
All Policy
All Parties

Model B
Preced
All Policy
All Parties

Model C
Random
All Policy
Pty Rest

Model D
Preced
All Policy
Pty Rest

PARTY
D with 2Ds (All Democrats) (reference)
D with 1D & 1R

-.19

-.19

-.15

-.12

(.31)

(.17)

(.36)

(.20)
-.41**

-.23

-.39**

-.18

(.31)

(.17)

(.36)

(.21)

-.26

-.40**

-.36

-.46**

(.33)

(.18)

(.38)

(.22)

-.19

-.60***

-.26

-.70***

(.33)

(.18)

(.38)

(.22)

R with 2Rs

-.05

-48**

.12

-.39

(All Reps)

(.40)

(.21)

(.48)

(.26)

R with 2Ds
D with 2Rs
R with 1R & 1D

GENDER
M with 2 Ms (All Men) (reference)
M with 1M & 1Wm
Wm with 2Ms
M with 2Wm
Wm with 1Wm & 1M

.19

.19*

.17

.24*

(.21)

(.11)

(.24)

(.14)

.20

.19

.20

.27**

(.21)

(.11)

(.24)

(.14)

-.44

.04

-.53

.31

(.33)

(.17)

(.36)

(.21)

-.19

.03

-.35

.22

(.31)

(.16)

(.34)

(.20)

Wm with 2Wm

-.94

.66*

-1.30

1.19**

(All Women)

(.95)

(.37)

(1.50)

(.50)

RACE
W with 2 Ws (All White) (reference)
W with 1W & 1NW
NW with 2Ws
W with 2NWs
NW with 1NW & 1W
NW with 2NWs
(All Non-White)

.10

-.03

.28

.07

(.21)

(.11)

(.24)

(.14)

.23

.01

.43*

.07

(.21)

(.12)

(.24)

(.14)

.79**

-.19

1.02***

.14

(.33)

(.22)

(.40)

(.28)

.74

.05

.97**

.20

(.32)

(.21)

(.39)

(.26)

___

-.34
(1.15)

___

-.10
(1.28)
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Random
All Policy
All Parties

Model B
Preced
All Policy
All Parties

Model C
Random
All Policy
Pty Rest
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Model D
Preced
All Policy
Pty Rest

All models include circuit fixed effects, year fixed effects, and independent variables measuring policy area, direction of the trial court
outcome, trial judge sitting by designation, defendant type (federal government, state government, business, other), and law type
(federal law, state law, both). Random sample models additionally contain a variable indicating whether the case was published. “Pty
Rest” in Models C & D indicate that the models contain only claims in which an individual (or class or them) sues a business or
government defendant.
N=
Pseudo R2=

3,351

6,512

2,556

4,814

.13

.10

.15

.12

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on claim.
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TABLE A-4: LOGIT MODEL OF VOTE-LEVEL PANEL EFFECTS IN 12(B)(6) OUTCOMES BY
POLICY SUBSET IN CLAIMS WITH INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS (INCLUDING CLASSES) SUING
BUSINESS OR GOVERNMENT
Model A
Random
Discrimination

Model B
Preced
Discrimination

Model C
Random
Other Civ Rts

Model D
Preced
Other Civ Rts

Model E
Random
Non-Civ Rts

Model F
Preced
Non-Civ Rts

PARTY
D with 2Ds (All Democrats) (reference)
D with 1D & 1R
R with 2Ds
D with 2Rs
R with 1R & 1D

.37

.08

-.15

.29

-.01

-.28

(.57)

(.55)

(.47)

(.39)

(.46)

(.29)

.09

-.13

-.37

-.14

-.14

-.50*

(.56)

(.55)

(.51)

(.40)

(.46)

(.29)
-1.04***

.55

.28

-.02

.06

-.13

(.60)

(.54)

(.49)

(.37)

(.55)

(.34)

.23

.05

-.37

-.31

-.06

-1.28***

(.62)

(.55)

(.51)

(.37)

(.54)

(.34)

R with 2Rs

-1.24*

.36

.21

.28

-.21

-.64*

(All Reps)

(.72)

(.74)

(.56)

(.43)

(.66)

(.39)

GENDER
M with 2 Ms (All Men) (reference)
M with 1M & 1Wm
Wm with 2Ms
M with 2Wm
Wm with 1Wm & 1M
Wm with 2Wm
(All Women)

-.33

.09

.83**

.62***

-.20

.20

(.42)

(.44)

(.39)

(.23)

(.38)

(.21)

-.70

-.03

1.05***

.68***

-.21

.27

(.43)

(.44)

(.39)

(.23)

(.38)

(.21)
.70**

.07

-.27

-.24

.01

-.75

(.47)

(.64)

(.49)

(.35)

(.48)

(.31)

.12

-.20

-.07

-.32

-.62

.70**

(.46)

(.63)

(.45)

(.35)

(.46)

(.31)

.88

1.16

.40

.94

1.43***

(1.08)

(1.41)

(1.00)

(.53)

___

(2.00)

RACE
W with 2 Ws (All White) (reference)
W with 1W & 1NW
NW with 2Ws
W with 2NWs
NW with 1NW & 1W

-.13

.23

1.09***

.05

.06

.17

(.35)

(.45)

(.39)

(.23)

(.35)

(.20)

-.11

.40

1.23***

-.06

.11

.18

(.35)

(.45)

(.39)

(.23)

(.35)

(.21)

.89

-.10

-.51

-.78*

.95*

.08

(.61)

(.70)

(.81)

(.46)

(.51)

(.43)

.88

.30

-.53

-.23

.94*

-.11

(.57)

(.70)

(.81)

(.38)

(.51)

(.42)

___

___

___

___

NW with 2NWs

1.95

(All Non-White)

(1.31)

-.18
(1.37)
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Model A
Random
Discrimination

Model B
Preced
Discrimination

Model C
Random
Other Civ Rts

Model D
Preced
Other Civ Rts

2185
Model E
Random
Non-Civ Rts

Model F
Preced
Non-Civ Rts

All models include circuit fixed effects, year fixed effects, and independent variables measuring policy area, direction of the trial court outcome, trial judge
sitting by designation, defendant type (federal government, state government, business, other), and law type (federal law, state law, both). Random sample
models additionally contain a variable indicating whether the case was published. All models contain only claims in which an individual (or class or them) sues
a business or government defendant.
N=
Pseudo R2=

1,218

737

1,519

2,115

1,266

2,367

.24

.17

.28

.17

.13

.15

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on claim.
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TABLE A-5: CLAIM-LEVEL PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF 12(B)(6) OUTCOMES POOLING
ACROSS POLICY AREAS FOR PARTY, GENDER, AND RACE PANEL COMBINATIONS
Model A
Random
All Policy
All Party

Model B
Preced
All Policy
All Party

Model C
Random
All Policy
Pty Rest

Model D
Preced
All Policy
Pty Rest

“___” indicates that panel type is not statistically distinguishable from the
reference category (in italics), or not significant in both individual and votelevel models.
** indicates no cases in model.

PARTY
3 Dems
1 Rep,
2 Dems
2 Reps,
1 Dem
3 Reps

14%

38%

13%

38%

___

___

___

___

___

24%

___

24%

___

24%

___

___

GENDER
3 Men
1 Wom,
2 Men
2 Wom,
1 Man
3 Wom

13%

27%

13%

27%

___

33%

___

34%

___

___

___

___

___

46%

**

59%

RACE
3 White
1 NW,
2 White
2 NW,
1 White
3 Non-White

11%

30%

10%

30%

___

___

___

___

___

___

___

___

**

___

**

___
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TABLE A-6: CLAIM-LEVEL PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF 12(B)(6) OUTCOMES IN POLICY
SUBSETS FOR PARTY, GENDER, AND RACE PANEL COMBINATIONS

Model A
Random
Discrimination

Model B
Preced
Discrimination

Model C
Random
Other
Civ Rts

Model D
Preced
Other
Civ Rts

Model E
Random
NonCiv Rts

Model F
Preced
NonCiv Rts

“___” indicates that panel type is not statistically distinguishable from the reference category (in
italics), or not significant in both individual and vote-level models.

** indicates no cases in model.

PARTY
3 Dems
1 Rep,
2 Dems
2 Reps,
1 Dem
3 Reps

14%

38%

17%

29%

16%

48%

___

___

___

___

___

___

___

___

___

___

___

16%

___

___

___

___

___

___

GENDER
3 Men
1 Wom,
2 Men
2 Wom,
1 Man
3 Wom

18%

36%

10%

24%

17%

21%

___

___

21%

37%

___

___

___

___

___

___

___

41%

**

**

___

___

___

58%

RACE
3 White
1 NW,
2 White
2 NW,
1 White
3 NW

12%

34%

11%

34%

10%

26%

___

___

25%

___

___

___

___

___

___

___

___

___

___

**

**

**

**

___
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TABLE A-7: VOTE-LEVEL PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF 12(B)(6) OUTCOMES POOLING
ACROSS POLICY AREAS FOR PARTY, GENDER, AND RACE PANEL COMBINATIONS
Model A
Random
All Policy
All Parties

Model B
Preced
All Policy
All Parties

Model C
Random
All Policy
Pty Rest

Model D
Preced
All Policy
Pty Rest

“___” indicates that panel type is not statistically distinguishable from the reference category (in
italics), or not significant in both individual and vote-level models.
** indicates no cases in model.

PARTY
D with 2Ds
(All Democrats)

17%

37%

17%

41%

D with 1D & 1R

___

___

___

___

R with 2Ds

___

24%

___

24%

D with 2Rs

___

24%

___

23%

R with 1R & 1D

___

22%

___

21%

R with 2Rs
(All Reps)

___

23%

___

___

GENDER
M with 2Ms
(All Men)

13%

28%

14%

27%

M with 1M & 1Wm

___

32%

___

33%

Wm with 2Ms

___

___

___

35%

M with 2Wm

___

___

___

___

Wm with 1Wm
& 1M

___

___

___

___

Wm with 2Wm
(All Women)

___

43%

___

54%

RACE
W with 2 Ws
(All White)

11%

30%

10%

30%

W with 1W & 1NW

___

___

___

___

NW with 2Ws

___

___

___

___

W with 2NWs

___

___

___

___

___

___

___

___

**

___

**

___

NW with 1NW
& 1W
NW with 2NWs
(All Non-White)
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TABLE A-8: VOTE-LEVEL PREDICTED PROBABILITIES

OF

12(B)(6) OUTCOMES

IN

POLICY

SUBSETS FOR PARTY, GENDER, AND RACE PANEL COMBINATIONS
Model A
Random
Discrimination

Model B
Preced
Discrimination

Model C
Random
Other
Civ Rts

Model D
Preced
Other
Civ Rts

Model E
Random
NonCiv Rts

Model F
Preced
NonCiv Rts

“___” indicates that panel type is not statistically distinguishable from the reference category (in italics), or not significant
in both individual and vote-level models.
** indicates no cases in model.

PARTY
D with 2Ds
(All Democrats)

13%

32%

19%

25%

16%

48%

D with 1D & 1R

___

___

___

___

___

___

R with 2Ds

___

___

___

___

___

21%

D with 2Rs

___

___

___

___

___

15%

R with 1R & 1D

___

___

___

___

___

14%

___

___

___

___

___

20%

R with 2Rs
(All Reps)

GENDER
M with 2Ms (All Men)

18%

34%

12%

24%

17%

21%

M with 1M & 1Wm

___

___

23%

38%

___

___

Wm with 2Ms

___

___

27%

41%

___

___

M with 2Wm

___

___

___

___

___

40%

Wm with 1Wm & 1M

___

___

___

___

___

39%

**

___

___

___

___

54%

Wm with 2Wm
(All Women)

RACE
W with 2 Ws (All White)

16%

34%

12%

30%

15%

26%

W with 1W & 1NW

___

___

26%

___

___

___

NW with 2Ws

___

___

29%

___

___

___

W with 2NWs

___

___

___

___

___

___

NW with 1NW & 1W

___

___

___

___

___

___

___

**

**

**

**

___

NW with 2NWs
(All Non-White)
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TABLE A-9: VOTE-LEVEL PANEL VARIABLES FOR PARTY, GENDER, AND RACE
Variable Description

Variable Name

Democratic Majority Panels
Democrat voting with 2 other Democrats (reference)

D with 2Ds

Democrat voting with 1 Democrat & 1 Republican

D with 1D & 1R

Republican voting with 2 Democrats

R with 2Ds

Republican Majority Panels
Democrat voting with 2 Republicans

D with 2Rs

Republican voting with 1 Republican & 1 Democrat

R with 1R & 1D

Republican voting with 2 other Republicans

R with 2Rs

Male Majority Panels
Man voting with 2 other Men (reference)

M with 2Ms

Man voting with 1 Man & 1 Woman

M with 1M & 1Wm

Woman voting with 2 Men

Wm with 2Ms

Female Majority Panels
Man voting with 2 Women

M with 2Wm

Woman voting with 1 Woman & 1 Man

Wm with 1Wm & 1M

Woman voting with 2 other Women

Wm with 2Wm

White/Other Majority Panels
White voting with 2 other Whites (reference)

W with 2Ws

White voting with 1 White & 1 Non-White

W with 1W & 1NW

Non-White voting with 2 Whites

NW with 2Ws

Non-White Majority Panels
White voting with 2 Non-Whites

W with 2NWs

Non-White voting with 1 Non-White & 1 White

NW with 1NW & 1W

Non-White voting with 2 other Non-Whites

NW with 2NWs
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TABLE A-10: NUMBER OF CLAIMS AND CASES WITH A MAJORITY OF WOMEN OR NONWHITE JUDGES
Regressions

2 Wm

3 Wm

2 Wm

3 Wm

2 NW

3 NW

2 NW

3 NW

COAs

COAs

Cases

Cases

COAs

COAs

Cases

Cases

206

22

128

13

82

10

55

3

329

39

185

15

134

3

88

156

10

94

8

62

9

39

2

219

25

125

12

81

2

53

2

83

7

42

6

26

6

21

3

34

2

22

2

15

1

14

1

88

6

48

6

34

0

24

0

95

5

53

4

29

0

18

0

83

3

61

3

41

9

24

2

115

19

71

8

48

2

30

2

Table A-1, Model A:
Random All, No Party
Restrictions (PR)
Table A-1, Model B:
Preced All, No PR
Table A-1, Model C:
Random All, PR
Table A-1, Model D:
Preced All, PR
Table A-2, Model A:
Random, Discrim, PR
Table A-2, Model B:
Preced, Discrim, PR

3

Table A-2, Model C:
Random, Other Civil
Rights, PR
Table A-2, Model D:
Preced, Other Civil
Rights, PR
Table A-2, Model E:
Random, Non-Civil
Rights, PR
Table A-2, Model F:
Preced, Non-Civil
Rights, PR

*

*

*

*

*

